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Abstract 
In contrast to the atmosphere of mistrust and division between confessions that was common to 
most polities during the Reformation era, the Peace of Augsburg, signed in 1555, declared the 
free imperial cities of the Holy Roman Empire a place where both Catholics and Lutherans could 
live together in peace. While historians readily acknowledge the exceptional nature of this clause 
of the Peace, they tend to downplay its historical significance through an undue focus on its 
long-term failures. In order to challenge this interpretation, this paper examines the successes 
and failures of the free imperial cities’ implementation of the Peace through a comparative 
analysis of religious coexistence in Augsburg, Cologne, and Nuremberg during the Peace’s 63-
year duration. This investigation reveals that while religious coexistence did eventually fail first 
in Nuremberg and then in Cologne, the Peace made major strides in the short term which offer 
important insights into the nature of tolerance and confessional conflict in urban Germany during 
the late Reformation era. 
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Introduction 
 Although by and large the Reformation era more than earned its reputation as a period of 
bitter conflicts between various Christian confessions and general intolerance of the religious 
other, some exceptional areas adopted a policy of religious pluralism. The free imperial cities of 
the Holy Roman Empire stand as one such example, as they conceded the right for both 
Lutherans and Catholics to live peacefully within their walls in the Peace of Augsburg. This 
unprecedented compromise between the otherwise antagonistic faiths stands as one of the first 
instances of official religious pluralism in early modern Europe, but at the same time, the uneven 
record of free imperial cities in their attempts to implement the terms of the Peace within their 
own particular social and political contexts raises its own series of questions. Most crucially, it 
illustrates the wide range of possibilities between the achievement of true toleration, in which 
followers of different religions could live peaceably alongside one another in full acceptance of 
each individual’s right to worship freely, and an environment of intolerance enacted through 
active persecution and religious exclusivism. As such, the implementation of the Peace in the 
free imperial cities provides a highly significant case study in the development of toleration in 
the western world, both in its successes and its failures. Therefore, this study examines to what 
extent the Peace of Augsburg made room for genuinely peaceful coexistence and toleration of 
the religious other in the free imperial cities. 
 In order to answer this question, this paper investigates the three largest of the free 
imperial cities, namely Cologne, Nuremberg, and Augsburg. These three represented a wide 
range in religious demographics, as at the onset of the treaty their respective populaces consisted 
of a strong Catholic majority, a Lutheran-dominated citizenry, and a more even mix of the two 
confessions. In addition, they stood among the most influential urban centres of the day, which 
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meant that their religious policies not only impacted their own citizenries, but also had the 
potential to sway the opinion of other leaders who faced similar decisions. In the peaceful period 
between the adoption of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and the outbreak of new hostilities in 
1618, these three cities chose and developed their own responses to the injunction for 
coexistence. Legal codes do not tell the whole story, however, for while some city authorities 
diligently enforced their official religious ordinances, others left infractions unpunished as long 
as they did not have any critical impact on the polity. Communal attitudes also played an 
important role in the realities of religious toleration, as they determined the ease with which 
religious minorities could integrate into society. This study therefore explores how each of these 
factors played out in three very different environments over the same span of time and highlights 
the extent to which the Peace of Augsburg influenced religious toleration in the free imperial 
cities. 
 Though historians have long noted the stark contrast between the example of the free 
imperial cities and the experiences of religious coexistence in the German principalities, the 
subject remains underrepresented in the historiographical record, especially in the period prior to 
the Thirty Years’ War. While many historians have studied either the development of the 
Reformation in the free imperial cities or the wider history of religious toleration in early modern 
Europe, few have directly examined the connection between the two topics, much less studied 
the specific ramifications of the Peace of Augsburg. Those that have done so focus almost 
exclusively on the examples of Dinkelsbühl, Ravensburg, Biberach, and Augsburg, the four 
Swabian free imperial cities whose biconfessional status endured through to the adoption of the 
Peace of Westphalia and beyond. Therefore, an important gap remains as to how the experiences 
of the other cities compares to those of the Swabian cities and what that reveals about the 
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effectiveness of the Peace. This study uses both the more studied example of Augsburg and the 
less examined cases of Cologne and Nuremberg to fill this void in the understanding of the early 
modern period and the development of current ideas of religious toleration. 
 Such a redress of the gaps in the historiographical record is only possible due to the wide 
breadth of primary sources available to scholars of the Reformation era. In particular, studies of 
the free imperial cities benefit from the extensive municipal archives maintained by the largest of 
these cities, including those of Augsburg, Cologne, and Nuremberg. The most relevant records 
come in two main varieties: the official documentation produced and preserved by the city itself, 
such as council declarations and criminal proceedings, and personal accounts from public figures 
who resided in the cities, including councillors, religious leaders, artists, and popular writers. 
Together, these provide a comprehensive view of religious life in the free imperial cities, from 
the official political stance of the leadership all the way down to the everyday realities of life as a 
minority group in the community, which plays a crucial role in this assessment of the Peace of 
Augsburg. 
 As this paper will demonstrate, the Peace initially enjoyed a great deal of success in 
promoting religious toleration in the free imperial cities of Cologne and Augsburg, though it 
made little headway in their sister-city of Nuremberg. The flaws of the treaty, however, 
especially its failure to specify which cities it applied to and how they ought to institute and 
protect biconfessionalism, eventually led to its failure in the face of external pressure from the 
increasingly aggressive religious factions of the Empire. In particular, the stark differences in 
how both officials and society handled religious minorities for the first several decades after the 
implementation of the Peace and in how they treated the same minority groups in the years just 
prior to the outbreak of fresh hostilities in the Thirty Years’ War demonstrates its fragility. Thus, 
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the Peace of Augsburg failed to create a durable and long-term peace between confessions, but it 
did succeed in giving new life to the conceptual power of religious toleration within the general 
populace of the free imperial cities, which would later play an important role in the achievement 
of true religious pluralism, albeit only in the four Swabian biconfessional cities and only after 
another war fought over religion. 
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Early Modern Doctrines of Heresy and Toleration 
The wider attitude of early modern European society towards issues of heresy and 
toleration naturally informed the particular responses of the free imperial cities to the challenge 
of religious pluralism. Due to an inherited tradition of intolerance that stretched back to the fifth 
century, Christendom entered the Reformation as a civilization deeply suspicious of any hint of 
heterodoxy. Religious pluralism of course had its defenders; even apart from the limited 
acceptance grudgingly granted to the Jewish religion, several prominent thinkers, who range 
from the eleventh-century bishop Waso of Liège to the fourteenth-century scholar Marsiglio of 
Padua, had proposed more radical ideas of toleration, but these views gained relatively little 
traction throughout the medieval era.1 The Reformation, which shattered western Christian unity, 
served to bring those ideas back to the forefront for the first time since the fall of the Roman 
Empire, but the dominant medieval attitudes towards heresy and religious intolerance prevailed 
in most places over more irenic voices. As a result, all three of the major Christian factions that 
emerged from of the Reformation ultimately rejected any compromise of coexistence with one 
another, which in turn led to the many religious wars of the early modern period. Ironically, it 
was these very conflicts which, largely due to the onset of war exhaustion and the pragmatic 
calculus of political leaders, eventually brought about many of the most significant cases of 
religious coexistence, including those of the free imperial cities. 
Naturally, the Roman Catholic Church maintained the most continuity with medieval 
thought on how to deal with heresy, rooted primarily in the teachings of Augustine of Hippo and 
Thomas Aquinas. St. Augustine, who faced his own battle against heresy in the form of the 
                                                          
1 Joseph Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, Volume I, trans. T.L. Westow (New York: Association Press, 1960), 
81-82; Diana Webb, "The Possibility of Toleration: Marsiglio and the City States of Italy," in Persecution and 
Toleration: Papers Read at the Twenty-Second Summer Meeting and the Twenty-Third Winter Meeting of the 
Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. W.J. Sheils (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 111. 
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Donatist Controversy, was the first to clearly articulate a theological argument in favour of 
persecution, though it came only after years of more pacific attempts to restore Christian unity in 
North Africa. In his own words, “there is a righteous persecution, which the Church of Christ 
inflicts upon the impious,” for “she persecutes in the spirit of love… to secure their eternal 
salvation."2 Though he initially preferred that authorities only intervene in religious affairs in 
order to protect the peaceful, he eventually concluded that given his interpretation of the parable 
of the great banquet, rulers had a legitimate right to force recalcitrant heretics to change their 
behaviour, since it aimed at their own benefit.3 Despite Augustine’s own reluctance, the church 
quickly and wholeheartedly adopted this theological justification of intolerance. Medieval 
theologians extended this conception of just persecution through an emphasis on the severity of 
heresy as a sin and the dangers that heresy posed to the rest of the community should it spread.4 
Thomas Aquinas, in particular, stridently defended the necessity of persecution of heresy, and he 
argued that once a Christian underwent baptism and thus accepted the laws of the Church, he or 
she “must be compelled, even physically, to fulfil what they have promised.”5 For non-
Christians, Aquinas adopted a less rigid stance; he admitted that one could not force another to 
believe, “because to believe depends on the will,” but he still recommended that Catholic rulers 
supress practice of other religions for the greater good of the Christian faithful.6 This strict 
position found widespread acceptance in the medieval Church and thus reinforced Augustine’s 
basic justification of persecution, though the fact that the Church had no clear definition of what 
                                                          
2 Ernest Nelson, "Persecution and Liberty: The Theory of Persecution," in Persecution and Liberty: Essays in Honor 
of George Lincoln Burr, editor unknown (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), 7 
3 Lecler, Toleration, Vol I, 58. 
4 Sebastian Castellio, Concerning Heretics: Whether They Are to be Persecuted and How They Are to be Treated, ed. 
Roland Bainton (New York: Octagon Books, 1965), 29-30. 
5 Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 20. 
6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 
1947), 1621, http://www.basilica.org/pages/ebooks/St.%20Thomas%20Aquinas-Summa%20Theologica.pdf. 
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defined heresy before the Council of Trent tempered the impact of this outlook somewhat.7 As 
such, the Catholic Church responded to the open challenges of Luther and Zwingli in a manner 
both severe and uncompromising, an attitude that persisted in the leadership of the Church and 
most Catholic nations throughout the Reformation era. 
Martin Luther, for his part, initially advanced a radical argument in favour of religious 
freedom, though such sentiments ultimately fell into disfavour within Lutheran doctrine. In his 
tract On Secular Authority, Luther spoke clearly and eloquently against the power of persecution 
to affect faith: “here God’s Word must strive; if that does not accomplish the end it will remain 
unaccomplished through secular power, though it fill the world with blood. Heresy is a spiritual 
matter, which no iron can strike, no fire burn, no water drown.”8 Other early Lutheran thinkers 
like Johann Brenz and Katarina Zell also joined him on this position, as the latter commented 
that “he who does evil, him shall the government punish, but it shall not compel and govern 
faith. It belongs to the heart and the conscience and not to the external man.”9 This clearly broke 
from common medieval attitudes, and in a way that served the new faith, itself a heresy from the 
Catholic perspective, quite well in the early days as it struggled to justify its rebellion against 
Rome. Once a number of princes embraced Lutheranism, however, the space for a theology of 
toleration dwindled away. Luther himself came to this conclusion during the upheaval of the 
Peasants’ War and eventually published his infamous Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes 
of Peasants, in which he openly advocated for the destruction of the rebels based on both their 
lawlessness and their blasphemy. From that point forward, Lutheranism became a much more 
                                                          
7 Castellio, Concerning Heretics, 29-30; Kamen, Rise, 20; Cary Nederman, "Introduction: Discourses and Contexts of 
Tolerance in Medieval Europe," in Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment, 
ed. John Laursen and Cary Nederman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 18. 
8 Martin Luther, On Secular Authority (Location unknown: Publisher unknown, 1523), 24, accessed February 29, 
2016, http://ollc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Secular-Authority-To-What-Extent-It-Should-Be-Obeyed.pdf. 
9 Castellio, Concerning Heretics, 156-157; Kamen, Rise, 69. 
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conventional magisterial movement and granted worldly rulers the right to punish secular and 
religious crimes alike. The seeds of toleration were thus present in the early days of Lutheranism, 
but they failed to flourish and ultimately withered away. 
In part due to the communal roots of the Reformed faith, Zwingli, Calvin, and their 
fellows tended to stand among the strictest theological thinkers when it came to ordinances on 
the religious purity of society. Though Calvin paid lip service to the ideals of toleration in the 
Institutes, his actions told a far different story.10 In Geneva, he constructed the Consistory 
system, which, unlike the Lutheran system’s dependence on princely intervention in religious 
matters, gave the local church both the authority and responsibility to policy orthodoxy. That 
system could afford no impulses towards toleration, as it would undermine the religious 
foundations of social order and discipline. Indeed, the Servetus controversy, sparked by Calvin’s 
execution of a heretical but peaceful visitor to Geneva, caused one of the first open debates on 
whether the culture of intolerance had gone too far; most of his contemporaries, including his 
eventual successor, Theodore Beza, agreed that it had not. As such, Reformed communities, like 
their Lutheran counterparts, also proved hostile environments for religious minorities. 
Despite the widespread acceptance of intolerant approaches, many voices continued to 
speak up for the idea of peaceful religious coexistence. Among them stood a handful of 
extremely influential theologians from each side of the confessional divide. Desiderius Erasmus, 
famed for his irenic nature, became the most well-known advocate for tolerance within the 
Catholic camp. Historian Wallace Ferguson notes that “to his mind, persecution for purely 
religious reasons was above all unchristian, a direct contravention of the spirit and example of 
                                                          
10 Castellio, Concerning Heretics, 203. 
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Christ.”11 Among the Protestant party, the Reformed theologian Sebastian Castellio served as the 
foremost champion of religious toleration. In his Concerning Heretics, he demonstrated that 
arguments against persecution existed in the theological writings of all three faiths and he did not 
shy away when its publication led to open confrontation with his own religious leaders, Calvin 
and Beza. Though individuals like Erasmus and Castellio never had the authority to effect 
substantial change in their confessions, they kept alive a steady undercurrent of dissatisfaction 
with persecution in intellectual circles. Such sentiments could be found more readily among the 
more radical thinkers of the day, for Anabaptist leaders like Hans Denck, Sebastian Franck, 
Balthasar Hubmaier, and David Joris advanced arguments for toleration.12 While in themselves 
the Anabaptists and other radical Christian groups represented only a tiny fraction of believers in 
early modern Europe, the shared Christian idiom allowed their message of tolerance to project 
beyond their own social circles and have relevance in the wider religious community. Therefore, 
while the religious establishment nowhere supported toleration, the ideal did have its defenders, 
several of whom had a long-term impact on their respective religious traditions. 
The minority opinion that stood against intolerance also extended outside the theological 
realm to the lay population, for questions of heresy and tolerance naturally elicited significant 
interest during a period of religious upheaval. In both England and France, tracts circulated 
among the populace that testify to the awareness of and support for ideals of religious 
toleration.13 Ironically, the greatest evidence for the spread of this ideal comes from Alfonso de 
Castro, the author of On the Just Punishment of Heretics. He set out to write that work when, to 
                                                          
11 Wallace Ferguson, "The Attitude of Erasmus Toward Toleration," in Persecution and Liberty: Essays in Honor of 
George Lincoln Burr, editor unknown (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), 175. 
12 Hans Denck, "Concerning True Love," in A Reformation Reader, ed. Denis Janz, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2008), 221; Castellio, Concerning Heretics, 190, 308; Kamen, Rise, 60-61. 
13 Henry Robinson, A Necessity for Liberty of Conscience (London: Publisher Unknown, 1644), 9; Joseph Lecler, 
Toleration and the Reformation, Volume II, trans. T.L. Westow (New York: Association Press, 1960), 53. 
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his shock and disgust, he heard “many and various people, who prided themselves on being 
faithful Catholics, criticizing the Emperor's religious wars as wrong and irreligious, and saying 
that it was not Christian to go to war against heretics, who should be conquered not with arms 
but with reasoning."14 While popular opinion could not do much to impact official religious 
policy beyond the extreme of outright rebellion, such evidence suggests that religious intolerance 
did not always enjoy the same level of support at the grassroots level as it did among theologians 
and other religious figures. Furthermore, as the confessions often depended on political leaders 
to enact their policies of persecution, a shift in sentiment among the elite could also make a 
crucial difference to the realities of religious coexistence. In France, the Low Countries, and the 
Holy Roman Empire, which became the central battlegrounds of the Reformation, politicians like 
Chancellor Michel de L'Hôpital and William of Orange built their careers on the promise that the 
benefits of a more inclusive government policy would outweigh its drawbacks.15 Other leaders 
objected to persecution on ethical grounds; famous examples from this period include those of 
Landgraf Philip of Hesse, who wrote that “we cannot find it in our conscience to put anyone to 
death by the sword on account of religion,” and King Báthory of Poland, who declared himself 
“king over peoples, not over consciences.”16 These powerful individuals chose to go against the 
trend in contentious times and embrace a more tolerant attitude, a decision that singlehandedly 
transformed their states into some of the most religiously diverse in early modern Europe. 
Secular sentiment thus could and did have an impact on the formation of religious policies. 
                                                          
14 Henry Kamen, "Toleration and Dissent in Sixteenth-Century Spain: The Alternative Tradition," The Sixteenth 
Century Journal 19 (1988): 12, accessed February 11, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2540957. 
15 Philip Benedict, "Un roi, une loi, deux fois: parameters for the history of Catholic-Reformed co-existence in 
France, 1555-1685," in Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation, ed. Ole Grell and Bob Scribner, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 69;  Kamen, Rise, 149. 
16 Kamen, Rise, 39, 120.  
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In the Reformation era, intolerant sentiments far outnumbered more irenic perspectives, 
but the latter did exist as an option and even had some influence. The question, therefore, that 
any study of the history of toleration must answer is why certain polities chose to take the path 
less travelled and embrace religious pluralism. In early modern Europe such a choice not only 
diverged from the common contemporary emphasis on the necessity of religious purity, but also 
came with many material risks, from political and religious isolation to social unrest, and so most 
cases of tolerance required both an external impetus, such as war exhaustion or political pressure, 
and the conviction of that polity’s leadership that religious coexistence would serve their best 
interests, whether for moral, economic, or other reasons. In the case of the free imperial cities, 
the Peace of Augsburg provided the initial push towards toleration, but what followed depended 
in large part on the composition of the cities’ governments as well as on subsequent shifts in the 
political climate of the Holy Roman Empire. 
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The Free Imperial Cities during the Reformation Era 
 The free imperial cities stood out from the crowd in more ways than one. Unlike the rest 
of the Holy Roman Empire, which was dominated by princely territories, they followed the 
republican model, with a city council, typically drawn from the patriciate and in some cases the 
guilds, that governed the city and its environs. Less than one hundred in number, these mainly 
south German cities were originally imperial cities in truth, under the direct rule of the Emperor, 
but by the time of the Reformation they had long since shaken off any semblance of outside 
control and replaced the imperially appointed stewards who had previously stood at the top of 
the governmental structure with locally elected bürgermeisters or a similar mayoral-style office. 
These cities were not, however, truly democratic in nature, but rather oligarchic, an aspect that 
only grew stronger over time as small committees supplanted the full assembly of the citizens as 
the primary body of governance. In the larger structure of the Empire, the free imperial cities had 
a college in the Reichstag, but their vote lacked any formal authority until the reforms of 1648. 
The cities did, however, include among their number the richest and most populated urban 
centres in Germany, which granted them some level of informal influence, as did their history of 
collective action in the face of external threats. As such, though they never held any great 
political power outside the reaches of the empire, they represented an influential portion of the 
German populace during the early modern period and their confessional choices during the 
contentious Reformation era formed a significant part of the wider religious development of the 
Holy Roman Empire. 
Ever since the publication of Bernd Moeller’s Reichsstadt und Reformation in 1962, 
historians have noted the powerful impact the Reformation had on the Holy Roman Empire’s 
urban centres and debated the causes of this phenomenon. Among the sixty-five free imperial 
cities to maintain their independence through the turmoil of the Reformation era, only fourteen 
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did not convert to Protestantism, and of those, only five lacked any reform movement 
whatsoever.17 This high success rate of Protestant teachings, so far beyond anything experienced 
in the more rural principalities of the Empire, demands some explanation, but no consensus 
exists among historians as to why this phenomenon occurred. The first scholars to address the 
topic, most notably Franz Lau and Bernd Moeller, attributed this rapid conversion experience to 
a grassroots movement among the burgher population that overwhelmed any opposition that 
might have arisen from the urban aristocracy. A new group of historians, however, soon 
countered this notion of ‘reform from below’ with the argument that the metamorphosis followed 
a pattern of top-down initiative, while still others later argued that outside pressures fueled the 
widespread conversions. The even more fundamental question of why the citizens of the free 
imperial citizens, whether aristocrat or commoner, tended to gravitate to the Protestant side of 
the Reformation continues to cause even greater debate, with theories that range from the 
inherent alignment of Protestant theology with burgher sensibilities to the need for a new type of 
religion to assuage the many anxieties of the urban population. This tangle of contradictory 
theories and models has to this point evaded any definite unraveling and has thus left the study of 
the Reformation in the free imperial cities a highly disputed field of study. 
Of the three cities examined in this paper, namely Cologne, Nuremberg, and Augsburg, 
only Cologne chose to remain loyal to the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, Cologne numbers 
among the few free imperial cities to never have any significant Protestant movement in its 
populace. For the council’s part, it had Luther’s writings publically burned as early as 1520 and 
never looked back. In his influential 1976 article, Robert Scribner maps out several factors that 
together set the stage for Cologne, the largest free imperial city, to become an outlier among their 
                                                          
17 Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume 1: From Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia 
1493-1648 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 241. 
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numbers. At the geopolitical level, Cologne’s precarious place as the only significant 
independent urban centre in the Empire’s northwest made it vulnerable to a wide variety of 
outside pressures, all of which encouraged loyalty to the Catholic emperors. For example, both 
Cologne’s dependence on trade with the imperially ruled Low Countries and the ever-present 
spectre of the archbishops of Cologne, who had longed for an excuse to retake their eponymous 
city ever since it had gained its independence in 1288, reinforced its dependence on imperial 
favour and thus its loyalty to the Catholic cause.18 Nevertheless, politics alone could not have 
maintained Catholicism in the face of a determined burgher movement in support of Luther’s 
teachings. Such a scenario never arose, however, because established Church institutions such as 
the university and the cathedral chapter had become far too entrenched in Cologne socially and 
intellectually to allow Protestantism to gain a foothold in the city.19 As such, Cologne developed 
into an unrivaled bastion of Catholicism and imperial loyalism that stood out from both its 
princely neighbours and its peers among the free imperial cities. 
Nuremberg, the third largest city in the Empire, took the opposite path and rapidly and 
wholeheartedly threw its lot in with the Reformation. Though the city council did make what 
Cecil Headlam called “a bare pretence of stopping the publication of Lutheran writings,” they 
abandoned even this slight admission to the wishes of the Emperor as early as 1524, when their 
representatives advocated openly at Rothenburg for the free imperial cities to disregard the 
Emperor’s edicts to supress Luther’s teachings and instead collectively determine a new religious 
course.20 Within its own territory, Nuremberg quickly instituted Lutheranism as the official 
religion, a move that garnered little opposition and a great deal of enthusiasm. Nuremberg did, 
                                                          
18 Robert Scribner, “Why was there no Reformation in Cologne?,” Historical Research 49 (1976): 224, accessed July 
14, 2016, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2281.1976.tb01686.x. 
19 Scribner, “Cologne,” 233-235; Matthew Lundin, Paper Memory: A Sixteenth-Century Townsman Writes His World 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 140. 
20 Cecil Headlam, The Story of Nuremberg (Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1970), 76. 
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however, differ from the majority of other imperial Protestant cities in two important ways. 
While other cities saw some level of push and pull between magistrate and citizen, in Nuremberg 
the city council unquestionably took the lead in the implementation of the Reformation. In the 
words of the Council’s own declaration, the councillors felt that “as a duty of the office entrusted 
to them and upon pain of losing their souls,” they must “provide for their subjects, over whom 
they are placed, not only in temporal… but also in spiritual… that is, with the holy gospel and 
word of God.”21 Gerald Strauss, the foremost scholar of Nuremberg’s history in the Reformation 
era, notes more pragmatically that the Reformation gave the council, already more powerful than 
the civic bodies of most other free imperial cities, the opportunity to channel public sentiment 
against the last holdout against its authority in the local church institutions.22 When it came to 
external politics, however, Nuremberg refused to join its coreligionists in opposition to the 
Emperor despite the council’s commitment to Protestantism and instead attempted to stay neutral 
in the numerous conflicts of the day, with varying levels of success. Nuremberg thus tackled the 
challenges of the Reformation era through an attempt to straddle the line between religious 
change and political continuity. 
Though the city council of Augsburg initially waffled in the face of the Reformation, it 
too eventually adopted Protestantism with zeal. Unlike Cologne, the city council never took an 
active stance against Protestant teachings, but it also did not follow Nuremberg’s model of active 
commitment to the new theology either. Instead, the city tolerated followers of both faiths and 
committed to neither party in the imperial politics of the 1520s. However, this policy eventually 
failed due to concerns about the isolation of the city from both traditional and potential new 
                                                          
21 Benjamin Kaplan, Divided By Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 103. 
22 Gerald Strauss, Nuremberg in the Sixteenth Century: City Politics and Life between Middle Ages and Modern 
Times (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 160. 
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allies, as well as the increased agitation from the Protestant majority for a definitive and official 
commitment. As such, the council officially embraced the Reformation in 1534, and from that 
point forward rapidly implemented changes to match that decision; the city joined the Protestant 
Schmalkaldic League in 1536 and shuttered the last Catholic churches in 1537. Despite the initial 
ambivalent approach of Augsburg’s ruling council during the early stages of the Reformation, 
which neared a policy of true toleration, pressures both internal and external eventually forced 
Augsburg to side openly with the Lutheran faith. That is not to say, however, that the city council 
became suddenly eager to impose religious uniformity. Instead, the magistrates simply sought to 
avoid debate through the removal any public signs of lingering Catholicism, but they never tried 
very hard to eliminate those pockets of society that remained loyal to the old faith, with several 
notable holdouts among their own number. This combination of open political alignment with 
the German Protestant cause with cautious domestic religious policy ultimately led Augsburg 
down a much different path than Nuremberg despite their similar experiences in the early stages 
of the Reformation. 
The dramatic defeat of the Protestant forces in the Schmalkaldic War of 1546-1547 
shattered the religious balance that the free imperial cities had so painstakingly established 
during the early years of the Reformation. Emboldened by his victory, Emperor Charles V issued 
his Augsburg Interim in 1548, which allowed a few small concessions to the Protestants, but for 
the most part embodied uncompromised Catholicism. The southern free imperial cities’ alliance 
with the rebellious princes drew Charles’ wrath in particular, and he forcibly imposed the Interim 
in many cities, a fate that his erstwhile ally Nuremberg did not escape. Meanwhile, those cities 
like Augsburg who had guildsmen on their council had their constitutions rewritten to give 
decisive control to the aristocracy, who Charles believed would show more loyalty to the old 
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faith. This new order did not last long, however, as Charles’ aggressive policy provoked former 
allies among the principalities to change sides and with the help of France decisively defeat him 
in the 1552 Princes’ War. With the spectre of imperial forces ready to enforce Charles’ plans 
suddenly removed, the Interim collapsed and Protestant governments returned to power in many 
cities. At the negotiating table, Ferdinand, the brother and future successor of Charles as well as 
the titular King of Germany, agreed to the policy of cuius region, eius religio, which allowed the 
princes to choose between Catholicism and Lutheranism on behalf of their territories, but he did 
not extend the same right to the free imperial cities. Article Twenty-Seven of the Peace of 
Augsburg, signed in 1555, reads as follows: 
In many free and Imperial cities, both religions – Our old religion and that of the 
Augsburg Confession – have for some time been practiced. They shall continue to 
exist and be maintained in these cities. The citizens and other residents of these 
free and Imperial cities, both of clerical and lay estates – shall continue to live 
peacefully and quietly with another. Neither party shall venture to abolish or force 
the other to abandon its religion, usages, or ceremonies. On the contrary, 
according to the provisions of this peace, each party shall leave the other to 
maintain in a peaceful and orderly fashion its religion, faith, usages, ordinances, 
and ceremonies, together with its possessions, just as is mandated above for the 
estates of both religions.23 
 
This unprecedented policy of biconfessionalism represented a major concession for both the 
imperial party, which had never wavered in its commitment to Catholicism, and the largely 
Protestant free imperial cities, who lacked the manpower and finances to continue their 
resistance, and it carried the potential to dramatically transform the state of religious diversity 
and tolerance in the urban centres of the Empire. 
However, the vague language of the Peace of Augsburg severely curtailed its 
effectiveness. For example, Article Twenty-Seven did not clearly stipulate the cities to which it 
should apply. Eight of the free imperial cities, including Augsburg, had significant Catholic 
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minorities, but even cities such as Nuremberg, which had become all but purely Lutheran before 
the imposition of the Interim, had a few remnant Catholic institutions that still survived within 
their territory. On the other side of the religious divide, Ferdinand had never intended to enforce 
toleration within the Catholic free imperial cities, but the Peace itself made no such exception, so 
the Protestant party might view any blatant violation of the truce by cities such as Cologne as a 
provocation. In addition, the Peace of Augsburg’s complete exclusion of any provisions for the 
Reformed faith, which eventually triggered the Thirty Years’ War, impacted the free imperial 
cities as much as it did the principalities, and it added an additional element of complication to 
the already chaotic religious environment of the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, even if 
Article Twenty-Seven had stated clearly who should fall under its jurisdiction, it did not dictate 
any concrete policies for the implementation of biconfessionalism beyond the behaviours that it 
outlawed, and the only mechanism to ensure obedience was the threat of imperial intervention, 
which could hold the southern free imperial cities in check but held much less fear for their 
northern counterparts. Therefore, each city had to determine for itself what degree of obedience 
it owed to this new ordinance, a state of affairs that robbed the implementation of the Peace of 
Augsburg of any consistency over the course of its sixty-three-year duration and instead led to a 
patchwork set of solutions that endured until the destruction of the Thirty Years’ War 
necessitated the construction of a wholly new order in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.24  
  
                                                          
24 Gerhard Pfeiffer, “Der Augsburger Religionsfrieden und die Reichsstädte,“ Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins für 
Schwaben und Neuburg 61 (1955): 283, accessed July 18, 2016, http://periodika.digitale-
sammlungen.de/schwaben/Blatt_bsb00010306,00229.html; Hans-Wolfgang Bergerhausen, Die Stadt Köln und die 
Reichsversammlungen im konfessionellen Zeitalter: Ein Beitrag zur korporativen reichsständischen Politik, 1555-
1616 (Köln: Kölnischer Geschichtesverein e.V., 1990), 163-164. 
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Historiographical Perspectives on Article Twenty-Seven 
Though historians have given little direct attention to Article Twenty-Seven beyond 
occasional studies into its implications for the Swabian free imperial cities, most who study the 
Holy Roman Empire during this time period acknowledge that it signified an unprecedented step 
towards confessional coexistence. Ole Grell describes this movement towards toleration as a 
“policy of pax et concordia,” which aptly captures the way in which many city councils viewed 
religious diversity: they did not see it as a positive and they certainly did not encourage it, but 
neither were they so concerned about it that they would risk economic and social disruption that 
might follow an attempt to suppress it.25 As Scott Dixon points out, the free imperial cities’ 
nature as commercial hubs had already made them places of great diversity even before Article 
Twenty-Seven mandated a policy of religious toleration, so the Peace of Augsburg represented 
not a stark change but rather continuity in that regard.26 As these and other historians 
acknowledge, this departure from the contemporary norms of intolerance and persecution makes 
the free imperial cities well worth examination in greater detail. Consequently, while Article 
Twenty-Seven does not represent entirely untrodden ground, it is an understudied portion of the 
Reformation era in Germany.  
 However, most such studies limit their findings and analysis to only the eight Swabian 
free imperial cities that had large populations of both Catholics and Protestants and thus most 
clearly experienced a state of biconfessionalism. This list - Ulm, Donauwörth, Kaufbeuren, 
Leutkirch, Biberach, Ravensburg, Dinkelsbühl, and Augsburg – appears again and again in the 
literature, most often to the exclusion of any mention of the other free imperial cities, even 
though, as Benjamin Kaplan notes, the Peace also served to protect monasteries and other 
                                                          
25 Ole Grell, Introduction to Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation, ed. Ole Grell and Bob Scribner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 
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institutions as safe havens for continued Catholic worship in many predominantly Protestant 
cities.27 In such a small field, the most dramatic examples of religious toleration draw the lion’s 
share of the attention despite the availability of many other worthy case studies. Some scholars, 
such as Po-Chia Hsia, justify this exclusive focus by noting that that these cities enshrined 
religious equality in law in a truly unique way, but most do not even reference the fact that the 
Peace of Augsburg made no clear distinction between the free imperial cities; in one such 
example, historian Michelle Hanson simply comments that Article Twenty-Seven “did not have 
a great impact” in the other cities and makes no more mention of them.28 While it is true that in 
the long run Article Twenty-Seven most deeply affected the eight Swabian cities, reliance on that 
fact alone to dictate the shape of research into the Peace not only obscures some of the smaller 
ways in which the Peace changed life in the free imperial cities, but also borders on historical 
determinism, as few could have foreseen this ultimately narrow implementation when the 
German estates first signed the Peace. In order to determine the extent of the Peace’s impact, 
therefore, a complete history must examine not only areas where it succeeded, but also cases in 
which it failed, and closely examine what factors made the difference between the two outcomes. 
 Furthermore, many of these same historians question whether the Peace of Augsburg ever 
truly established a state of religious tolerance in the Swabian free imperial cities, much less any 
of the others. Kaplan asserts unequivocally that “biconfessionalism was never the preferred 
solution in early modern Europe - to the contrary, it was usually the product of circumstances 
that made it impossible for rulers to maintain even a thin pretense that they and their subjects 
                                                          
27 Hans Guggisberg, "Tolerance and intolerance in sixteenth-century Basle," in Tolerance and Intolerance in the 
European Reformation, ed. Ole Grell and Bob Scribner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 147; Po-
Chia Hsia, Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe, 1550-1750 (London: Routledge, 1989), 82; Kaplan, 
Divided by Faith, 208. 
28 Hsia, Social Discipline, 73; Michelle Hanson, Religious Identity in an Early Reformation Community: Augsburg, 
1517 to 1555 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2009), 217. 
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were religiously united" and Robert Scribner agrees that the Peace represented an “enforced 
compromise” rather than anything more substantial.29 Because of this “expedient” element to the 
Peace, Gerhard Pfeiffer concludes that it was “only apparently a triumph of the tolerance 
ideal.”30 While these historians certainly hit upon a crucial fact in their observation that few 
leaders in the free imperial cities would have chosen to implement a policy of official 
coexistence outside of the context of the Peace, exceptions to that rule do exist. Furthermore, 
arguments such as Pfeiffer’s conflate the cause of the change with its results, for nothing 
precludes those forced to change their ways from nevertheless genuinely pursuing that change. 
Anton Schindling and Alexandra Walsham take a different approach in their critiques of Article 
Twenty-Seven in that they focus on the less than ideal realities of religious coexistence in the 
free imperial cities. Both historians emphasize the social divisions that often arose between 
confessions when forced to occupy the same physical space.31 In her study of Augsburg, 
however, Michelle Hanson offers a counterpoint to this stance and notes that ordinary individuals 
in social roles high and low demonstrated a remarkable degree of acceptance towards the 
religious other in everyday life.32 The existence of two such contradictory descriptions in the 
literature raises a crucial question: did the free imperial cities exercise true toleration, or did they 
just adopt the appearance of tolerance for the sake of the Peace? This study, therefore, seeks to 
answer this question by examining how Augsburg, Cologne, and Nuremberg responded to the 
challenge of religious coexistence posed by Article Twenty-Seven of the Peace of Augsburg. 
                                                          
29 Kaplan, Divided by Faith, 203; Bob Scribner, "Preconditions of tolerance and intolerance in sixteenth-century 
Germany," in Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation, ed. Ole Grell and Bob Scribner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 36. 
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ein Triumph der Toleranzidee“ (translated by the author), Pfeiffer, “Augsburger Religionsfrieden,” 276. 
31 Anton Schindling, “Neighbours of a Different Faith: Confessional Coexistence and Parity in the Territorial States 
and Towns of the Empire,” in 1648, War and Peace in Europe, ed. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (Münster: 
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Contested Tolerance in Augsburg 
 If any of the free imperial cities received exactly what they desired from the Peace of 
Augsburg, it was its namesake.  Caught between newly resurgent Catholicism among the elite 
and the entrenched Protestantism of the common people, few in Augsburg saw reason to hope for 
the imminent reestablishment of a religiously homogenous community, so the city council 
latched onto the idea of a biconfessional civic policy even before the end of the Princes’ War. 
Indeed, one of their own number, Hans Jakob Fugger, played an important role in the creation of 
Article Twenty-Seven in an attempt to remedy the problems of the free imperial cities. In 
addition to his status as the head of one of the two most influential aristocratic clans in Augsburg 
at the time, Hans Jakob’s irenic nature and friendship with notable figures on both sides of the 
conflict made him a natural advocate for a compromise solution.33 In his correspondence with 
the Emperor, he pushed his liege to allow for select polities such as Augsburg to maintain two 
faiths rather than taking one side or the other and assured him that in his experience religious 
pluralism presented no real difficulties to civic peace.34 The council as a whole corroborated 
Hans Jakob’s account of interreligious relations in Augsburg; they wrote in 1555 that “one does 
not feel burdened by the coexistence of two religions in Augsburg.”35 Their perspective, of 
course, had its biases, given their position as the politically and economically dominant and yet 
still minority group within the city, but it did reflect a genuine desire on the part of the oligarchy 
for a solution that would promote religious coexistence. Given the role of the city council in the 
                                                          
33 Mark Häberlein, The Fuggers of Augsburg: Pursuing Wealth and Honor in Renaissance Germany (Charlottesville: 
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creation of Article Twenty-Seven, therefore, Augsburg had positioned itself well to implement a 
truly tolerant civic policy. 
 Once set along the path to biconfessionalism, the council began to propagate the ideal of 
religious coexistence in their rhetoric of governance. As early as 1554, well before the great 
powers of the Empire had come to a full agreement on the terms of the Peace, they declared in a 
public ordinance that “past events and daily experiences make it obvious to everyone what unity 
and good follow from peaceful and friendly cohabitation, and what detriment as well as ruinous 
harm and damage to the soul, body, honor, and goods must be expected (and has so often 
occurred in large communities) as a result of disagreeableness, envy, and hate.”36 This was a 
truly extraordinary statement, not only in the context of the time, with Europe torn apart by 
religious conflict, but in the whole history of Christendom after the collapse of the Roman 
Empire. Even in later years, when confessional relations became much more strained, the council 
maintained this position, at least in official documentation. In the midst of the Kalenderstreit, 
which marked the greatest period of tension in Augsburg between the Peace and the Thirty 
Years’ War, a decree reminded the people that “every member of the council and the citizenry of 
the other religion should be allowed the same civil rights without hindrance.”37 Once Augsburg 
finally overcame that internal conflict, the council made it their habit to annually reissue an 
endorsement of toleration.38 The aristocracy of Augsburg thus sought to make their stance as 
clear as possible and did not hesitate to declare their ongoing commitment to toleration. The 
official rhetoric of the city had set the stage for the emergence of a community in which both 
Protestants and Catholics could live in peace. 
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From its inception, however, Augsburg’s tolerant civic policy also had a darker side. In 
order to ensure that the public discourse on religious coexistence remained positive, the council 
made liberal use of censorship to silence potential critics. In the same 1554 decree cited above, 
the city council went on to state that “it has come to the council's attention that, among other 
things, the preachers in the cathedral have been employing heated and harsh words from the open 
pulpit” and to order religious leaders “to strive from now on toward appropriate modesty, and to 
avoid heated insults entirely.”39 Furthermore, the decree also noted that the “Honorable Council 
has renewed its charge to the booksellers to cease selling all kinds of slanderous and defamatory 
books from either of the religions.”40 The authorities recognized publications and sermons as the 
most common methods to disseminate religious beliefs both conventional and more troublesome, 
so they sought to stifle them in order to prevent any discord from arising. In June of 1579, the 
council cracked down on so-called slander in music and reminded the citizenry that “such things 
are not only in direct violation of the law and the Holy Imperial Recess; they are also wrongful in 
and of themselves, and give cause for all manner of resentment and harm.”41 This further 
intruded into the public sphere, as citizens could no longer even express discontent in folk songs, 
which generally served as a casual media outlet for the illiterate. Nor did the council use 
censorship simply as a stopgap measure, aimed at a reestablishment of stability in the city after a 
particular crisis or period of unrest. As late as 1600, the council issued a new edict that outlawed 
debate between schools of different confessions, as such arguments had often raised tensions 
when circulated by local pastors.42 Censorship remained the norm throughout this period, and the 
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oligarchy continued to view any open discussion of religion as an element of destabilization that 
must be quashed. The price of peace, in the mind of the urban oligarchy, was freedom of speech. 
Despite the cloud of suspicion that hung over religious dialogue, the council’s efforts to 
foster peace between confessions enjoyed a good deal of success in the period immediately after 
the Peace. “At that time,” as the great Augsburg historian Paul von Stetten wrote, “everyone, 
even the Cardinal and the Bishop of Augsburg themselves, were assiduous to guard against 
innovations against the Religious Peace.”43 No one desired a return to the chaos and instability of 
war and the frequent changes in leadership that it had brought, so even the fiercest of religious 
critics, such as Hieronymus Fröschel, could only do little more than grumble against the Peace or 
leave the city.44 The goodwill did not last and many feared that religious conflict would follow 
shortly, but little beyond rumors manifested itself. Georg Müller, certainly no friend of the 
Catholic Church, as he later demonstrated through his pivotal role in the Kalenderstreit, 
nevertheless remembered those years fondly. He wrote:  
Because [as a result of the Religious Peace of 1555] both religions were assured 
that they would be left unhindered in their practice and were completely freed of 
any danger of being repressed or driven out of the city by the opposition, all 
distrust and anxiety in the hearts of the citizens immediately ceased. For some 
years, they lived together so trustingly that both sides intermarried regularly, 
called on one another as godparents, and joined and served one another at 
weddings, funerals, and social and business events with merry banquets and 
parties. Outside of the churches and pulpits, not the least sign of discord could be 
found among the citizens.45 
In an age in which most considered the mere presence of heresy offensive, this stands out as a 
truly remarkable achievement. While no purely secular effort could ever bring about a full 
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reconciliation between the confessions, for a time Augsburg became a place where people of 
different faiths could interact without any of the open tensions so characteristic of the period. 
Indeed, citizens of Augsburg could not always even clearly define the boundaries 
between the confessions. In the middle and lower classes in particular, many remained unaware 
of where their own confession stood on particular issues, a state that stemmed from the 
Protestant dispute over the Formula of Concord and the ongoing Catholic Council of Trent.46 
The upper classes tended to have a clearer conceptualization of their faith and its doctrines, but 
the great families still lacked the intense religious divide that characterized more antagonist 
communities.47 This inability to clearly identify the religious other greatly diminished the 
potential for interconfessional conflicts real or imagined. As a result, confessional tensions, 
which had reached a new high in Augsburg with the imposition of the Interim, actually decreased 
over the first few decades of the Peace, with a corresponding increase in the number of 
conversions from Lutheran to Catholic and vice versa, as well as in their social acceptability.48 
The absolute number of changes in faith remained small, but those that did occur provided a 
level of mobility between the two groups socially. Augsburg remained divided over faith, but 
this did not separate its citizens into two exclusive and antagonistic camps, but rather created two 
interlocked communities that together formed a greater whole. 
 A hallmark of this period of peaceful religious coexistence was the trust placed by 
Protestant and Catholic alike in the Augsburg city council, which acted as executor and 
guarantor of the Peace of Augsburg. Membership carried no particular faith requirement, so the 
relative strength of either faith in the administration waxed and waned freely, but such shifts did 
not correspond to greater mistrust of the council by the weaker confession as it did in later 
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years.49 Georg Müller once again stands as witness to this fact, for though he wrote of the faiths 
as separate parties within the council that might “take the upper hand” at any given time, he 
claimed that “in this atmosphere of trust… no one was paying much attention to the council 
elections” and that “no one on either side had reason to complain, or suffered any 
disadvantage.”50 As long as the populace trusted the city government to act impartially to 
institute the Peace, citizens need not fear that a council majority for the other confession might 
lead to a new policy of persecution. That the first such major fright came only with the death of 
Stadtpfleger Heinrich Rehlinger and his replacement by the ardent Catholic Anton Christoph 
Rehlinger speaks to the confidence citizens had in the city leadership as constituted in the initial 
post-war period.51 Suspicions of confessional bias only emerged with the introduction of new, 
untested officials; the old core had earned the citizenry’s trust through repeated fulfillment of 
their tolerant rhetoric. Without clear mechanisms to maintain confessional balance, this trust 
proved the foundation upon which policies of religious toleration succeeded or failed in 
Augsburg. 
 While interreligious relations remained positive on the whole, areas of tension certainly 
did exist. The activities of the Jesuits, who the Protestants widely mistrusted as agents of Rome 
and its agenda of renewed Catholic dominance, in particular alarmed several prominent figures 
among the citizenry. Müller reserves his harshest criticisms for the Jesuits, who he called God’s 
“corrupting scourge” and accused of trying “with great zeal to turn every proper Catholic against 
the Lutherans as if they were the worst kind of heretics – or even as if they were dogs and 
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beasts.”52 Müller did not stand alone in his vitriolic response to the perceived Jesuit threat, for 
Peter Canisius, the great champion of the Jesuit cause in Germany, reported many such verbal 
attacks in his Acta et Epistolae.53 No doubt the Lutherans felt threatened by the renewed vigour 
of the Catholic Reformation and the Jesuits seem to have served as the most visible symbol of 
that danger. Further evidence of how their arrival strained interreligious relationships comes 
from some of the extant popular literature of that period, which testifies to the abhorrent fear 
with which the Protestants viewed the Jesuits.54 Though many of the accusations thrown at their 
feet in such works were clearly fabricated, others spoke to the true disquiet the Lutherans felt at 
the return of exorcisms and other widely sensationalized Catholic rituals to their city. Even in 
this early period of the Peace, tensions had begun to bubble to the surface as the Protestants felt 
their position weakened by renewed Catholic strength and active engagement with the general 
populace. 
 Radical Christian groups like the Anabaptists also landed outside of the general concord 
established after the Princes’ War. The Peace of Augsburg specifically limited its protections to 
Lutheranism and Catholicism, so the city had no legal obligation to defend the freedom of other 
religious minorities, some of which, most prominently Anabaptism, still technically fell under 
the death penalty in the Empire, and the council, for its part, saw no reason to waver from its 
policy of harsh punishment for radical groups, which it had enacted as early as 1528.55 Despite 
that fact, small pockets of Anabaptists persisted in Augsburg throughout this period.56 In order to 
counteract further expansion of the underground churches, the city government remained vigilant 
against potential sectarians, ready to crack down on any overt defiance of the established 
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biconfessional religious order. The records left behind by the investigation of David Altenstetter, 
who was arrested in 1598 due to his regular attendance of both Catholic and Lutheran churches, 
provides a particularly notable case study of this dynamic. During his questioning, his 
interrogators specifically asked whether he knew of the two religion policy of the city and when 
he admitted that he did, they insisted that he declare allegiance to one or the other.57 He 
countered with the protest that he held no heretical beliefs, but rather simply preferred to keep an 
open mind between the two confessions; the resultant case material demonstrates the relative 
freedom he had previously enjoyed to attend both Catholic and Lutheran churches, but also the 
limited allowances made by the authorities for religious nonconformity, for they categorically 
rejected his defense with the flat statement that “his peculiar faith is not tolerated here.”58 Just 
because Augsburg practiced a policy of relative toleration did not mean that the council hesitated 
to take decisive action when individuals breached the bounds of its patience, though they usually 
did limit their countermeasures to imprisonment and intimidation. Augsburg acted as a haven for 
Catholics and Lutherans alike, but it remained far from an unqualified and unlimited bastion of 
religious freedom. 
 When it came to diplomacy with its far more confessionally rigid neighbours, Augsburg 
had to walk a fine line between religious neutrality and political isolation. This put the city in an 
awkward position when urged to lend its voice to the great religious conversations of the era. 
When the Protestant estates invited Augsburg to their 1557 Frankfurt assembly, the city sent two 
representatives, but they refused to make any commitment to a faith-based association of states 
and instead pointedly emphasized their biconfessional policy in their official contributions to the 
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conference.59 When further courted by the Protestants, this time by envoys of Duke Wolfgang 
von Zweibrücken in 1561, the papal nuncio present in the city feared that Augsburg would 
finally pick a side in the struggle, but Hans Jakob Fugger led the council to vote against a motion 
to pledge the city to the Protestant camp.60 Decisions such as these offended their former allies 
from the days of the Schmalkaldic League, who saw Augsburg as a defector from their cause. At 
the same time, the council made it clear that they would send no representative to the Council of 
Trent, for, as they put it, a neutral policy “conserves the good peace and tranquility of both his 
citizens and religion.”61 On this side, too, Augsburg’s position left the papacy and its allies 
disappointed by the Catholic leadership’s lack of commitment to their faith in what many saw as 
a life or death struggle. Therefore, by falling between the two sides of the religious debate, 
Augsburg risked complete isolation, a position that the city could hardly afford given the greater 
geopolitical strength of its Bavarian and Austrian neighbours. 
Augsburg sought to compensate for this through membership in the confessionally 
neutral Landsberger Bund, but in the end the endeavour simply provided another illustration of 
how the city’s neutrality in matters of faith isolated it from its neighbours. The Bund, a defensive 
alliance founded by Bavaria, Austria, Augsburg, and the archbishopric of Salzburg for the 
“management of imperial order and public peace,” offered crucial security to Augsburg amidst 
the unstable politics of the Empire, but the imperial city nevertheless often found itself at odds 
with the rest of the mostly Catholic members.62 The first dispute arose around the decision to 
include Würzberg, Bamberg, and Nuremberg in the Bund, which Augsburg strongly opposed due 
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to a fear that the induction of another three states known for their loyalty to the Habsburgs would 
make the Bund appear a pro-Catholic alliance.63 While the Protestant powers might find 
Augsburg’s membership in a small regional alliance understandable, they would not think so 
charitably of the city’s incorporation into a powerful political bloc controlled by Catholics and 
perceived traitors to the Protestant cause. Because of this dynamic, Augsburg eventually aligned 
with Nuremberg within the Bund to oppose any move to add any other Catholic states to the 
Bund. Both free imperial cities not only feared the external optics of such actions, which could 
provoke further hostility towards them in the Protestant camp, but also the potential to incite 
their own populaces against a seemingly Catholic-aligned foreign policy.64 Furthermore, every 
additional Catholic member of the Bund threated to tip the inner balance away from neutrality 
and towards open confessionalization.65 This intransigence became a source of endless 
frustration to their supposed allies in the Bund, who saw their collective project paralyzed by the 
religious objections of the two cities. When the Bund finally collapsed under the weight of its 
own confessional contradictions near the end of the sixteenth century, it further proved the point 
that events had suggested ever since the Peace of Augsburg: a policy that attempted to thread the 
needle between confessional camps would inevitably struggle to succeed in the confessionally 
charged atmosphere of the Reformation era. 
Over time, Augsburg’s balancing act between the Protestant and Catholic parties in 
imperial politics, which historian Paul Warmbrunn dubbed its “Schaukelpolitik,” or swing 
politics, came to define its existence as a sovereign state.66 This was the price of Augsburg’s 
internal religious dynamics, for though the Catholic dominated aristocracy could determine the 
                                                          
63 Warmbrunn, Zwei Konfessionen, 147. 
64 Warmbrunn, Zwei Konfessionen, 148. 
65 Winfried Mogge, Nürnberg und der Landsberger Bund (1556-1598): Ein Betrag zur Geschichte des 
Konfessionellen Zeitalters (Erlangen: Schriftenreihe des Stadtarchivs Nürnberg, 1976), 82. 
66 Warmbrunn, Zwei Konfessionen, 147. 
 
 
32 
 
foreign policy of the city to a certain extent, a fact that allowed them to avoid any commitment to 
the Protestant cause in imperial politics, they dared not align too closely with their 
denominational brethren lest the largely Protestant citizenry view such moves as religiously 
motivated.67 As a result, Augsburg’s isolation made it increasingly susceptible to pressure from 
states with no vested interest in Augsburg’s tolerant religious policies and who indeed wished to 
eliminate such enclaves of religious diversity. Anton Christoph Rehlinger understood the city’s 
vulnerability well.  He noted that quite apart from the necessities of political survival in early 
modern Europe, Augsburg could not afford to lose the support of Bavaria and Austria for an 
even more basic reason: they controlled the flow of food and other supplies into the city.68 
Augsburg needed Protestant allies to defy the Catholic powers that surrounded it but could ill 
afford an all-out war against them, since it could not survive, let alone win, such a conflict. As a 
result, Augsburg occupied a truly unenviable political position in the period between the Peace 
of Augsburg and the Thirty Years’ War, one brought about almost entirely by its suspension 
between the two confessional camps that dominated imperial politics in that era. 
 The council’s attempts to stay in sync with their neighbours inadvertently triggered the 
first great internal religious struggle in Augsburg since the adoption of the Peace of Augsburg in 
a series of events that became known as the Kalenderstreit. At the root of the crisis stood the 
creation of the Gregorian calendar, for Catholics and Protestants in the Empire split over whether 
it to adopt it as the new standard for timekeeping or reject it as an unnecessary papal innovation, 
which put the biconfessional Augsburg in another awkward position. Ultimately, the council 
decided in early 1583 that to remain on the Julian calendar would cause too much economic 
disruption given the dominantly Catholic environs of the free imperial city, so they began to 
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implement the Gregorian calendar despite the dissatisfaction of their mostly Lutheran populace.69 
The council anticipated such objections and took care to note that they had introduced the 
calendar “for purely civic and political reasons... without the least intention, however, of 
obstructing or interfering in any way in the teaching, belief, order, or ceremonies of one or the 
other of the two religions."70 By this reasoning, the issue had nothing to do with religion at all, 
but rather came as a necessary adaptation to Augsburg’s geopolitical environment, so it did not 
infringe on the rights enshrined in the Peace. The council hoped that despite some unhappiness 
with the decision, their logical arguments would satisfy any opponents and the issue would end 
there. 
 Events quickly proved that they had underestimated the uproar the new calendar would 
cause among the Protestant citizens. Even aside from the confessional aspects of a calendar that 
bore the name of the Pope himself, time still carried a great deal of religious meaning, for even 
this small adjustment would shift religious holidays and take local observances out of line with 
the rest of the Protestant world. Georg Müller, whom the council had once already summoned to 
reprimand him for rabble-rousing against the Jesuits, became the unofficial leader of the 
movement, and he declared that “it is obvious that the fight about the calendar is as much the 
result of pure malice and coercion on the part of the Catholics” and a reversal of the council’s 
decision “is necessary for survival among the Protestants.”71 With statements such as these, 
Protestant leaders not only rejected the council’s decision, but also questioned its impartiality 
given the Catholic majority among its members. The administration tried to diffuse the situation 
by quietly banishing Müller, but the Protestants discovered and thwarted the covert arrest, which 
further escalated the crisis into a true revolt of the Protestant party, who demanded not only a 
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return to the old calendar, but also new ordinances to prevent further perceived abuse of office 
by the Catholic magistrates.72 One letter of protest, which made its rounds in late 1583, accused 
the council of “trying to make a papal city” and concluded with the threat that if the calendar “is 
not done away with, then we of the community will be strong enough to take action. We ask our 
Lords to think about this in order to protect themselves from harm, so that we can continue to 
live in peace."73 The Protestants thus positioned themselves as defenders of the religious balance 
in Augsburg, but underneath the rhetoric, the conflict had begun to solidify the social boundaries 
between the confessions. As long as the Kalenderstreit continued, Augsburg functioned not as 
one city with two religions, but two communities at war over control of the same polity. 
 It did not take long for the conflict to spill outside of the bounds of Augsburg’s city walls. 
Württemberg initiated the wave of foreign interventions with its theological defense of the 
Protestant position and declaration that the council’s actions violated of the Peace of Augsburg.74 
This intrusion into Augsburg’s domestic affairs led other states to take notice and line up behind 
the two factions, which emboldened them against one another. The potential for wider conflict 
eventually drew the imperial court into the struggle, but by the end of 1585 two commissions’ 
attempts at compromise solutions, which left the Gregorian calendar in place but also instituted 
new safeguards for Protestant religious freedom, had still failed to diffuse the tensions.75 The 
Protestants remained intransigent in their opposition to the calendar and simply refused to 
operate by it, while the council and their fellow Catholics continued to insist on its necessity. As 
Scott Dixon points out, the involvement of confessional supporters from other German polities 
also served to entrench the divides within Augsburg, for it allowed each side to “project the local 
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quarrel onto a broader canvas and think in terms of German freedom or Imperial justice while 
defending local rights.”76 This further encouraged the two factions to hold onto the conflict long 
past any point of easy reconciliation, since each felt convinced of the political value of their 
struggle in addition to the already present religious motivations. The Kalenderstreit only came to 
a final conclusion in 1591, when Augsburg’s fellow free imperial cities forced the council to 
compromise further on the issue of municipal religious controls and clerical appointments.77 
Augsburg thus spent nearly a decade locked in sectarian strife, an event which would continue to 
shape the city’s character for decades. 
Though the city had been snatched from the edge of open rebellion and the threat of all 
out confession conflict had passed, the relationship between the two confessions never returned 
to the pacific state they had once enjoyed. After such a long struggle, Lutherans and Catholics 
could not easily return to the freely intermingled coexistence of the early years of the Peace and 
instead continued to see one another as diametrically opposed factions.78 The records left behind 
by the imperial commissions, which had interviewed many of the prominent citizens of 
Augsburg in their investigations, provide particularly critical evidence of this phenomenon. The 
patrician David Weiss directed the blame squarely at the council in his testimony, for as he saw 
it, they had precipitated the conflict through abuses of the Peace and by “trying to force upon 
them new, unusual directives,” while Jakob Mayer, Anton Welser, and Felix Welser all 
commented on the dominance of Catholic families in the council and the resultant confessional 
imbalance in the adminstration.79 Never again would the citizens assume the council impartial in 
matters of faith, and so the Protestants viewed each new ordinance with suspicion. Other 
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interviews offer similar insights into the mindset of Catholics in Augsburg; the patricians Hans 
Fugger and Conrad Rehlinger and the merchant Hans Hannold all expressed their distrust of the 
common people, though they disagreed over whether they had caused the trouble over religion or 
merely out of a desire to stir up trouble.80 Just as the Protestants had begun to identify the council 
with Catholic interests, so too did the aristocracy begin to associate Protestant beliefs with 
stereotypes of the common man’s unruliness. Divisions that had existed prior to the 
Kalenderstreit but that had mostly remained latent had now become embedded in the worldview 
of Augsburg’s foremost citizens, which could not help but make efforts at true toleration all the 
more difficult. 
One clear narrative that emerged out of the Kalenderstreit was that the clergy posed a 
clear and present danger to the maintenance of the peace. Both Anton Christoph Rehlinger and 
Hans Fugger singled out Georg Müller and his fellow preachers as the main culprits behind the 
crisis and suggested that a desire for political power had motivated them; Fugger told the 
imperial commission that “what the preachers presented to the common man, the people 
believed, especially that they wanted to take their preachers and religion away, which embittered 
them against the authorities.”81 William Sulzer agreed that the clergy carried a great deal of 
responsibility for the unrest, while Endreß Zelling noted that when sermons became politicized, 
the citizenry could no longer distinguish between civic disputes and religious issues.82 Such 
influence over the populace’s perception of events posed a direct threat to the aristocracy’s 
authority within the city, and thus the council felt it necessary to curb this power. The patriciate 
had toyed with similar notions in the past, for Marx Fugger had suggested the council banish so-
called “inflammatory preachers” as early as 1580, and they tried to do exactly that several times 
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during the Kalenderstreit, with mixed success.83 The aftermath of the struggle simply further 
convinced the magistrates of its necessity and, as a result, they became much more concerned 
with and actively involved in careful observation of the priesthood. Among other measures, the 
council bound Protestant pastors by a new civic oath; they had to promise to work against “the 
embitterment of the common man” and to “testify to the planting of peace and unity in the 
city.”84 However high minded the formulation of the oath, though, to the citizenry such a one 
sided requirement could not help but reinforce their belief in the administration’s pro-Catholic 
bias. The active conflict may have died away, but religion and the control of belief continued to 
act as a battleground in Augsburg internal politics in the years to come. 
After the Kalenderstreit, the Protestants continued to call into question the legitimacy of 
the city council given the continued dominance of the great Catholic families, an argument that 
contributed greatly to the accelerating confessionalization of the city. Ever since the election of 
Anton Christoph Rehlinger in 1575 to the one of the city’s two Stadtpfleger offices, a lifelong 
appointment equivalent to that of mayor, the confessional balance in the council had tilted 
dramatically towards the Catholic.85 The close alliance between the Rehlingers and the Fuggers, 
who already held the other Stadtpfleger office and had since Hans Jakob’s departure from the 
city represented more adamantly Catholic sentiments in opposition to the confessionally mixed 
and thus more tolerant Welser-led faction, only increased the concerns of Protestant observers.86 
As such, the premise of the government’s religious neutrality became severely compromised, a 
situation that continued through to the Thirty Years’ War. Indeed, the citizenry came to take the 
Fugger and thus Catholic stranglehold over the council almost for granted; a verse that circulated 
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in Augsburg during this period openly stated “the Rehlinger govern, the Fugger triumph.”87 As a 
result, the Lutheran antipathy towards the council that had come to a head during the 
Kalenderstreit never entirely dissipated, though over time the magistrates managed to restore 
some degree of trust. In one case in 1618, a Protestant went so far as to assure his correspondents 
in Ulm that the council’s disparity in membership did not mean that Protestants could not trust 
the magistrates to act fairly and protect the Lutheran community.88 This level of trust seems to 
have been the exception rather than the rule, but it still speaks to a restoration in the relationship 
between the Protestant populace and their Catholic leadership. The Kalenderstreit had damaged 
the government’s reputation, but not irreparably. 
A more severe consequence of the religious imbalance in the council came from the 
subsequent shift in the political discourse of the city. Just as the council had become associated 
with Catholicism, the citizens of Augsburg began to see particular policies and platforms as 
associated with one confession or another.89 While city politics had always had religious 
ramifications, this ensured a further polarization between the two confessions as they fought not 
only for their faith but also their desired political outcome. Even more notably, however, the 
Lutheran faction began to contest whether or not religious affairs should fall under the authority 
of the council at all.90 This departed radically from the common political theory of the day and 
though the Protestants lacked the level of influence necessary to force through such a change, it 
did give them a new rhetorical edge with which to fend off official attempts to maintain control 
over their religious systems. The sentiment also began to trickle down to the common people; in 
a work authored around 1610 but never published, Protestant pastors noted questions from their 
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parishioners about whether “a Protestant can serve in a Catholic regime.”91 Not only does this 
sort of question betray the fact that ordinary citizens had begun to conceptualize the Augsburg 
government not as biconfessional but as Catholic, it also raises the issue of whether Lutheranism 
prohibits cooperation in such a government. These new political ideas posed a significant threat 
and impediment to the effectiveness of the Augsburg city council, as a administration that lacks 
legitimacy will soon find that it lacks authority as well. 
Indeed, around this same period, the system of censorship and control that Augsburg’s 
leadership had so painstakingly constructed began to fall apart. The number of commoners that 
the authorities hauled before the courts to answer for slanderous singing testifies to popular 
disregard of the legislation of 1579 despite the council’s best effort to suppress such music.92 
Fear of punishment alone no longer deterred the boldest individuals as resentment and discord 
continued to bubble to the surface. In another case in 1600, the council arrested the author of a 
particularly troublesome book but then had to immediately release him due to pressure from his 
Protestant supporters.93 The council’s repeated instructions to pastors to refrain from provocative 
speech while in the pulpit also seem to have failed, as extant polemics from this period show 
many instances of ad hominem attacks on the other faith.94 The council did not dare respond to 
even this overt disobedience, as they remembered all too well the troubles that had followed their 
attempted arrest of Georg Müller. As long as Augsburg remained in a state of extreme hostility 
that divided the city between Catholics and Protestants, no amount of political pressure could 
reshape the rhetorical narrative into one of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. 
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Developments in Augsburg’s social life mirrored the political changes in the city, and this 
period experienced a defined pattern of segregation in the public sphere. Places where the faiths 
had once freely interacted slowly became more confessionally defined. To take just one example, 
the Jesuits established a Catholic alternative to the primarily Protestant city gymnasium in 1581 
and though at first the two rival systems did have some students of the opposite faith, their 
numbers gradually declined as the years progressed.95 Confession influenced even where citizens 
lived, as both confessions tended to reside in the areas around their respective churches.96 No 
longer did members of different religions associate casually with one another, as much because 
systems evolved to prevent such fraternization as because they actively avoided such scenarios. 
Names also served as a more subtle but no less significant marker of increased 
confessionalization, as Lutheran families tended to avoid monikers with Catholic associations 
like Maria in favour of Old Testament-inspired names, and Ignaz, a name that honoured the 
Jesuit founder Ignatius Loyola, became popular among Catholic parents.97 Religion played a 
crucial role in early modern identity and as the religions grew apart, individuals’ perception of 
themselves in relation to the perceived other also underwent a metamorphosis. Official services 
also eventually split into separate streams along confessional lines; in one example, the council 
divided the city’s accommodations for pilgrims by faith in 1611.98 Justified by efficiency and 
concerns about equitable treatment, such developments testified to the two confessions’ sharply 
diminished desire for cooperation and cohabitation. Though Augsburg had left the early 
Reformation era as a city in which two religions lived together in relative harmony, by the end of 
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the Kalenderstreit the situation had devolved into one of reluctant coexistence rather than open 
toleration. 
In the face of these new challenges, the council’s efforts proved inadequate to the 
prevention of future civil unrest, though the city never came as close to outright revolution as it 
had in the Kalenderstreit. In 1608, new tensions erupted over servants who worked in the 
households of the opposite confession, which led to the events known as the Ehehaltenstreit. 
Protestant pastors began to lambast the supposed “grudges and bitter hearts” of Catholic 
servants, who they accused of subjecting “our true religion and holy sacraments to the highest 
dishonour, insult and slander.”99 They called upon their congregation to expel such troublesome 
elements from their homes, a step that threatened both economic disruption and further isolation 
of the two religious communities within Augsburg. The Catholic priests of Augsburg, for their 
part, blamed the escalated tensions on the “excessively heated, toxic sermons and blasphemies” 
of their religious counterparts.100 Both sides thus accused the other of provocations that triggered 
the unrest and characterized their own actions as justified reactions to undue attacks, which only 
served to create more bad blood between them. Though the moment of crisis passed relatively 
quickly, the events of the Ehehaltenstreit spoke to a greater truth about the situation in Augsburg. 
As Horst Jesse concluded, the populace of Augsburg was caught between the reality of their 
society, in which they could not realistically achieve a total separation of the two confessions, 
and their fear that to associate with the religious other would invite the potential for 
conversion.101 Both Lutheranism and Catholicism valued religious purity too highly to abandon 
the ideal, no matter how impossible its achievement given Augsburg’s demographics. Civic 
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unrest, then, constantly threatened Augsburg as long as this underlying tension remained 
unaddressed. 
In the end, these changes resulted in the emergence of a fully confessionalized age in 
Augsburg. Each of the hallmarks of Augsburg’s initially successful experiment in toleration – a 
government trusted by both confessions, a freely intermixed society, and a positive discourse on 
religious coexistence – had faded away, replaced by a community of religious tension, political 
struggle, and social divisions. While the fact of the matter remained that Lutherans and Catholics 
continued to live side by side in Augsburg, the optimism of the 1550s, in which leaders like Hans 
Jakob Fugger saw toleration as a desired outcome, had vanished. Now the people saw religious 
coexistence as a necessary evil rather than a desired state of affairs. The Peace of Augsburg had 
achieved its goals to establish an environment that allowed individuals to enjoy the freedom to 
practice either religion without hindrance, but only by the narrowest of margins. 
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Stifled Tolerance in Cologne 
 The free imperial city of Cologne entered the second half of the sixteenth century in a 
different situation than Augsburg, but ultimately followed a very similar trajectory. Cologne had 
always envisioned itself as a holy city loyal to Rome, Emperor, and Catholic Church and on the 
surface the Peace seemed to offer no reasons to change that outlook. Unlike Augsburg, Cologne 
also enjoyed near unity in faith internally, with never more than ten percent of its populace 
among the religious minority, so the city lacked a core of resistance that might have swayed the 
council to a more tolerant course of action. Indeed, even if one considered Cologne’s small 
Protestant minority significant enough to categorize it as a confessionally mixed city, 
Ferdinand’s clear intention to unofficially exempt the Catholic free imperial cities from Article 
Twenty-Seven left Cologne free to continue to pursue its own convictions in its religious policy. 
Furthermore, while Cologne found itself geographically removed from most of the Catholic 
German states, its importance in the eyes of the Catholic powers and its proximity to the Spanish 
Low Countries meant that it did not suffer isolation from its confessional brethren to the same 
extent that Augsburg and Nuremberg did from the major Protestant states. As a result, few pre-
existing factors indicated that Cologne’s leaders would feel the need to give anything beyond the 
barest nod to tolerance in their rule over the city. 
 The rhetorical tendencies of Cologne’s leadership only served to enhance its image as the 
most firmly Catholic of German cities. Like Augsburg, Cologne used its public declarations to 
promulgate its civic identity, but the identity it tried to convey differed substantially from its 
sister city. As Sigrun Haude puts it, “Cologne liked to portray itself as the most Catholic of all 
cities, uncontaminated by any heresy.”102 The city council openly bragged about its religious 
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purity and in one instance told the Hanseatic diet in 1535 that “as soon as we in Cologne got hold 
of Anabaptists, Sacramentarians, or other sectarians and rebels, we burned, beheaded, or 
drowned them. Although our city is wide and large and contains many people, we saw to it that 
no such elements would enter our city... so that - thanks be to God - Cologne knows of no heresy 
in its city."103 This was an obvious exaggeration, but the city leadership had made their point 
clearly: Cologne would not tolerate even the slightest degree of open religious nonconformity 
within its walls. The city’s massive number of religious institutions and sacred relics further 
heightened its reputation as a holy city.”104 From the city’s majestic cathedral to the humblest 
reliquary, these hallowed sites and objects lent their aura of righteous devotion to the image of 
Cologne as a whole in the minds of contemporaries. As far as externalities indicated, Cologne 
remained wholly and openly devoted to the Catholic cause. 
 The laws of Cologne also reflected this desire to identify Cologne as solely and purely 
Catholic through the connections they drew between religion and the rights and privileges of the 
city’s residents. First and foremost, the council barred any non-Catholics from holding public 
office in 1562. 105 Without representation in the leadership of the city, Protestants had little hope 
for the prospects of top-down change in the city’s religious policy. Hermann Weinsberg, a 
councillor during the first several decades of the Peace, confirms in his account of daily life in 
Cologne that not only did the aristocracy consist primarily of Catholic supporters, but it also 
outlawed open shows of religious dissent in order to ensure that the populace would also remain 
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loyal to Rome.106 This constrained access to the public sphere denied Protestantism the exposure 
necessary for it to flourish, as it could not grow rapidly enough to pose a true challenge to the 
religious status quo. Finally, in 1616 the council took the final logical step to ensure the purity of 
the community through their decree that only loyal Catholic believers could hold citizenship in 
Cologne.107 Protestants and other religious minorities could live in the city and rent property, but 
they could not own land or vote.108 This last blow completed the disenfranchisement of 
Cologne’s religious minorities and further alienated them from everyday civic life, for now their 
faith forever labelled them as outsiders in the community. In the legal code, social participation 
in Cologne required belief in the Catholic faith, so religious dissenters had no place within its 
civic identity. 
 All of this rhetoric and legislation, however, served to obscure the fact that Cologne 
actually did very little to maintain its religious purity, and in some ways actively undermined it. 
Cologne’s freedom to act on intolerant impulses had always been and would always be limited 
by the realities of its situation as a center of commerce, which required a certain level of 
openness to both foreigners with divergent beliefs and the influx of new ideas into its own 
populace.109 Therefore, because Cologne could not both maintain its economic position and close 
itself off from the outside influences, it could never attain a true state of confessional purity. 
Moreover, members of the urban elite like Weinsberg simply did not see Protestant heresies as 
the greatest danger to social order. To use the words of Po-Chia Hsia, “brutality in the name of 
confessional allegiance was for Weinsberg and his contemporaries the bane of civility.”110 From 
this perspective, the responsibility for the mid-century religious conflicts did not fall on the 
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confessional division itself, but on the uncompromisingly aggressive stances towards the 
religious other held by the leaders of the various factions. Therefore, the Cologne elite saw no 
need for such extremes in their own polity. Instead, the leaders of Cologne pursued an even-
keeled policy of tacit toleration as long as none of the religious minorities attempted to challenge 
Catholicism’s place as the sole official faith of the city.111 The administration primarily sought 
civic peace and when events forced them to choose between concord and conformity, it chose the 
former with little hesitation. Cologne may not have formally accepted its religious minorities, but 
they nevertheless made significant economic and social contributions to the community. 
The tolerant attitude of Cologne’s leadership most commonly manifested itself in a 
simple failure to enforce its own intolerant edicts. Even in the early days of the Reformation, 
numerous authors published works that openly flouted Cologne’s censorship laws but drew no 
punishment, while other records indicate that prominent nonconformist citizens received only 
admonishments to act moderately in the pursuit of their faith.112 The magistrates were well aware 
of such dissidents, but they chose to look the other way in the vast majority of cases. As long as 
religious minorities avoided any major disruptions of civic life, the council contentedly ignored 
private expressions of forbidden faiths, and even when such things spilled out into the open, it 
proved cautious and slow to act.113 Weinsberg recorded in his journal one instance in 1567 when 
a foreign Calvinist minister stirred up a large crowd with his public proselytization without 
provoking anything more from the authorities than a feeble request to move his sermon from the 
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streets to a local church.114 Even this dangerous and overt disturbance, exactly the sort of event 
the council hoped to dissuade through its strong pronouncements, had not stirred the council to 
violence. Legislation only holds as much weight as invested in it by the authorities and because 
of events such as these, both locals and visitors knew well that in Cologne the intolerant 
ordinances on the book carried no real authority.  
 Indeed, in the early years of the Peace the Cologne administration did not even enforce 
the lynchpin of its policy of religious purity, namely its requirement for the councillors 
themselves to be Catholic. Not until 1579 did the council reject its first non-Catholic nominee 
from the Gaffeln, the city’s guild-like corporations.115 This meant that for decades, Protestants 
had openly participated in the highest levels of government in direct disobedience of that very 
government’s laws; indeed, one Protestant, Ailff von Straelen, sat on the council for a full forty 
years.116 This state of affairs could only have encouraged ordinary citizens to rebel against the 
city’s religious ordinances. After 1583 onwards, internal restrictions on entrance into the Gaffeln 
tightened, with the priests of potential members required to vouch for the authenticity of their 
loyalty to Catholicism, but almost half of the Gaffeln still managed to elect Protestants as their 
representatives on the council in the period from 1576 to 1595.117 While the Catholicism of the 
council slowly became more entrenched, the magistrates lacked the conviction or audacity 
necessary to push the patience of the citizenry and so in many cases they approved the choice of 
the Gaffeln despite their misgivings. As such, through the first four decades of the Peace, 
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Protestant involvement in the leadership of that supposed purest of German Catholic cities 
remained common. 
 The magistrates also allowed and even encouraged the immigration of foreigners into the 
city, despite the fact that many of those newcomers held non-Catholic beliefs. During the tenure 
of Bürgermeister Konstantin von Lyskirchen, who had a notably irenic outlook on religious 
matters, the council prioritized the economic good of the city over matters of faith and welcomed 
skilled labourers and wealthy merchants into Cologne irrespective of their beliefs.118 Though 
some of these newcomers inevitably brought heretical ideas with them into the city, the 
magistrates felt confident that the potential gains outweighed the correspondent risk. Those 
forced out of the Low Countries by the Eighty Years’ War in particular streamed into Cologne, 
both due to its proximity and because of a history of trade relationships, and since the 
administration hoped these refugees would help restore the city’s once prosperous textile 
industry, it waived the existing prohibitions against foreign ownership of property in Cologne 
and expedited the process required to obtain citizenship for any who desired it.119 Heinz 
Schilling estimates that in a period of only five years, two thousand Dutchmen migrated to 
Cologne, a substantial influx for a city of only forty thousand.120 Of course, most of these 
refugees had fled from Spanish persecution because of their Protestant beliefs, a fact the council 
knew well, so this constituted a conscious decision to actively undermine their own religious 
policy by welcoming Calvinists and other religious dissidents into the city with open arms. 
While the aristocracy did value religious purity, they did not value it highly enough to turn away 
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those who could enhance the secular welfare of the city, and therefore their decisions 
compromised any real hope to attain the status of a city wholly united behind one faith. 
All of this created an atmosphere not nearly as intolerant as the city council wished 
outsiders to imagine, a fact to which the openness of the populace to religious diversity attested. 
Though the population of religious dissenters never exceeded a late sixteenth century height of 
approximately four thousand individuals, they remained a very real presence in Cologne 
throughout this period and few bothered to entirely conceal their nonconformity.121 While 
outsiders might have been deceived by the strict pronouncements of the council on issues of 
religious purity, the citizenry of Cologne could easily see through the bluster to the reality of the 
situation. Weinsberg’s account testifies to the fact that the majority of the citizenry did not view 
Protestantism with hostility, and even he himself seemed more than happy to discuss matters of 
faith with non-Catholics, as he did with his Calvinist guest John Tonberg in 1579.122 Even at the 
highest levels of society, many did not see those of other faiths as a group that deserved fear or 
hatred. The common people appeared if anything even less concerned about religious difference 
and made no great effort to maintain pure Catholicism in the highest ranks of the Gaffeln, let 
alone in the rank and file.123 The economic records of this time also demonstrate no overt signs 
of discrimination, as Catholics freely partnered with Dutch Calvinist immigrants in the trades 
and business.124 Differences in belief simply did not seem to factor into the everyday life of 
Cologne during this period. In combination with the realities of Cologne’s continued religious 
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diversity, this lack of strong confessional divisions likely contributed to the lax official policy 
and made the magistrates even less interested in any active persecution.125 Without the support of 
the populace, the administration was not eager to begin a bloody crusade against a substantial 
and productive part of society. For all of Cologne’s propaganda, the state of the city itself put the 
lie to claims of pure Catholic loyalty and instead revealed an urban centre tolerant of difference 
as long as it contributed economically and did not threaten the peace. 
Still, certain confessional issues surpassed the limits of the Cologne leadership’s 
tolerance, as its treatment of Anabaptism and other radical Christian sects demonstrated. While 
the council could tolerate Lutherans and even Calvinists, as they ultimately shared Catholicism’s 
vision of communal religion, radical Christians often rejected that paradigm, a notion that 
challenged the administration’s vision of a unified society.126 This reflected the basic religious 
policy of the council – anything that would not disrupt the social order was acceptable, but 
dangers to that order had to be expunged immediately. As a result, the magistrates persecuted 
Anabaptism relentlessly. In 1565, they arrested sixty-three suspected Anabaptists and any of 
those who would not recant their faith faced summary execution.127 Similarly, in 1595 authorities 
threw seventeen Anabaptists into prison and eventually banished them from the city.128 Events 
like these demonstrate the lengths to which the council would go to preserve its community from 
religious groups it perceived as true threats. Like Augsburg, Cologne had no interest in sheltering 
the widely distrusted radical Christian groups and instead pursued a harsh policy of repression. 
Even here, however, the magistrates hesitated to enforce their edicts with violent 
persecution. From the very beginning, execution served as a last resort, only used when the 
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council felt genuinely threatened by the religious dissidents in question.129 This did not reflect 
any genuine tolerance on the part of the council, but rather the same reluctance to stir up social 
unrest that had held them back from active persecution of Protestants. Still, after 1562 the 
magistrates began to avoid the death penalty even in the most extreme cases of religious crime, 
and the purge of 1565 eventually proved the final known case of the execution of heretics.130 The 
fear of Anabaptism that had arisen after the disaster of Münster faded over time and the 
aristocracy felt less pressure to aggressively root out the heresy. From that point onward, the 
Anabaptist community had the ability to survive, if not flourish; the city continued to subject 
them to political and social exclusion and even occasional expulsion, but they never again 
threatened their lives.131 Such was the lot of radical Christians in almost all of Europe, so small 
numbers continued to live in Cologne despite the dangers throughout this period. Anabaptists 
might not have enjoyed the same freedoms in Cologne as other religions, but the council once 
again proved averse to the violence of a thorough purge of the city. 
The religious atmosphere in Cologne began to change in the early 1570s with the 
intervention of external powers into the day-to-day affairs of the city. At last, the magistrates’ 
laissez-faire religious policy had drawn the attention of those who had an even stronger vested 
interest in Cologne’s religious purity than those who lived in the city itself. In early 1570, the 
Emperor and the Archbishop of Cologne, as well as representatives of the King of Spain and the 
Pope, warned the council that they would no longer tolerate their protection of religious 
dissidents, but the council gave these admonitions little heed beyond a reassuring but hollow 
official response.132 The four foreign powers represented the most influential of Cologne’s 
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Catholic allies, but the councillors simply did not believe that they would take an active hand in 
internal civic politics. They were wrong. In response to the council’s intransigence, the Duke of 
Alba, who held the governorship of the Low Countries at the time, forbade any Dutch citizens 
from attending the University of Cologne, which threatened to rob it of a crucial source of 
students.133 The aristocracy, which had strong connections to the university, in turn pressured the 
council to accede to Alba’s demands so that he would lift the embargo.134 Religious tolerance 
was no longer a primarily local matter of economic and social calculus, for it now threated to not 
only alienate important nearby states but also undermine a major civic institution and 
consequently a large number of its locally influential patrons. Cologne’s leadership had felt up to 
this point free to act upon its own interests, but its vulnerability to external demands had 
suddenly become very apparent. 
The increase in foreign pressure coincided with shifts in how the most influential citizens 
of Cologne viewed their new Dutch neighbours. Previously, Bürgermeister Lyskirchen and his 
supporters had controlled the council, which led to an administration largely disinterested in the 
regulation of religion for its own sake and content to simply keep dissidents under observation, 
but in the middle of 1570 power shifted to a new faction.135 Kannegießer and Geil, both members 
of a more religiously conservative group in the aristocracy, gained the offices of Bürgermeister 
and thus control over the city’s religious policy.136 The new administration shared many of the 
concerns of the city’s irate Catholic neighbours, which made it much more willing to implement 
policies that would appease them. The economic appeal of the Calvinist Dutch immigrants also 
faded, as those local crafts that the council had hoped to revive with an influx of skilled workers 
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now felt threatened by new competition and began to call for their expulsion.137 The Gaffeln, 
which loosely represented the workers and merchants of the city, now also had a powerful 
incentive to put their support behind a new policy of intolerance. In this way, a multitude of 
factors came together to change the atmosphere of Cologne to one much more hostile to the 
Dutch Calvinists than had previously existed. 
This confluence of events marked the decisive shift in Cologne’s relationship with its 
new Calvinist residents, who found themselves suddenly unwelcome in the city. On July 21, 
1570, the council issued an ordinance demanding new immigrants who had arrived in the past 
four years prove that they had lived as faithful Catholics and ordered those who would not or 
could not do so to leave the city by August 13.138 This decision did not spare those who had 
already obtained citizenship, either, but lumped them in with the rest of the Dutch refugees.139 
This did not represent a simple change of course, but an outright rejection of a decade’s worth of 
tolerant religious policy, as the move prioritized communal purity over the threat of civic 
upheaval. Contemporary accounts claim that two thousand heretics left the city, and while that 
number is almost certainly exaggerated given Cologne’s total population of only forty thousand, 
the council edict did force out a large portion of the immigrants.140 Not all did so, however, as 
many of the richest or most influential of the newcomers successful delayed or even entirely 
circumvented their expulsion.141 These exceptions aside, the Dutch Calvinists who had fled 
religious persecution in their homeland now found themselves homeless for a second time in 
only a few years. This harsh decree made one thing clear: if Cologne had once proven a safe 
haven for Protestants, it was no longer one. 
                                                          
137 Bosbach, “Köln: Erzstift und Freie Reichsstadt,“ 72-73. 
138 Bergerhausen, Die Stadt Köln, 152. 
139 Bergerhausen, Die Stadt Köln, 152. 
140 Schwerhoff, Köln im Kreuzverhör, 243-244. 
141 Schwerhoff, Köln im Kreuzverhör, 243-244; Schilling, Niederländische Exulanten, 59. 
 
 
54 
 
Nor was the administration satisfied with a simple expulsion of the foreigners among its 
religious minorities; it also began to crack down on Calvinists within its own native population. 
In November of 1571, the city Gewaltmeister, with the help of a tip from a disillusioned member 
of the Reformed community, discovered nineteen Calvinists in the midst of a religious assembly 
and arrested them.142 Two accounts of these events have survived to the present day, one from 
Hermann Weinsburg and the other from Johann Rethius, the scion of a powerful Cologne 
politician and a great champion of the Catholic cause in his own right. Though the former 
remained stoic in his record of the apprehension, Rethius openly praised God in the record of the 
events preserved in his journal, as he viewed it as an answer to prayer.143 The authorities had 
grown bold enough to move against one religious minority in the city, and public sentiment, at 
least among the aristocracy, had begun to shift against such dissidents as well. Notably, several 
of the arrested group attempted to deflect the investigation with assurances that their group had 
no political intentions, but such arguments did not dissuade their interrogators.144 Unlike in 
previous years, divergent religious belief sufficed to bring prosecution even without civic 
disturbances. After weeks of imprisonment and the torture of at least some of the prisoners, most 
of the accused, including three tried formally by Cologne’s High Court, secured their release 
after they recanted their former beliefs.145 While the magistrates avoided outright banishment or 
execution, their new policy bore all the hallmarks of the violent religious persecution so common 
in other parts of Reformation Europe. The Calvinists swept up in the raid faced incarceration, 
corporal punishment, and conversion under duress simply for belief in a confession that had been 
tacitly if not officially accepted only two years earlier.  As it put its new policy of persecution 
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into practice, the council willingly went beyond what its allies demanded and actively pursued 
the ideal of a unified Catholic community. 
 While the much smaller Lutheran community escaped most of the consequences of 
Cologne’s newly intolerant religious policy for several years, this changed in 1579 as the result 
of another foreign intervention. The Catholic powers of the Holy Roman Empire still felt far 
from secure about the state of religion in Cologne, which remained in their mind crucial to the 
confessional battle both for its role as a safe haven for Catholics in the region and its reputation 
as a bastion of the faith.146 As such, the imperial Catholic bloc did not rest on the gains from its 
victory in the matter of the Calvinist minority but resolved to involve itself once again in the 
internal politics of the city. In early 1579, the imperial commissioners Philip of Winnenberg and 
Philipp of Nassau arrived in the city determined to complete the Catholicization of the city.147 
Though they obviously could not achieve a complete purge of the city, they used their influence 
to effect major changes in the civic policy of the city and set the city down the road of further 
confessionalization. As the only remaining religious minority not subject to criminal persecution, 
the Lutherans naturally became the target of this campaign. 
The council itself became the primary battleground for the imperial intervention. Though 
laws existed that made Catholicism a requirement of membership on the city council, the Gaffeln 
had ignored these ordinances up to this point, a state of affairs that the imperial commission 
resolved to change. As such, they pressured the magistrates to expel not only any known 
Protestant council members, but also those who they could not readily identify as loyal Catholics 
and forbid any such individuals from subsequent elections.148 In other words, the two 
commissioners and their backers not only demanded the council fulfil the laws on record, but 
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also urged it to go beyond them to keep anyone who would not support a policy of renewed 
confessional vigour out of positions of leadership. Weinsberg provides a complete account of the 
events that followed, which began with the investigation of three councillors in particular: Jacob 
Omphalius, Arnt Jabach, and Herman Smidtman. Despite their protests, the three men lost their 
seats on the council in December 1579, and in response, Weinsberg piously wrote in his journal, 
“God grant that the council chamber remain in all good Catholic faith.”149 The tide had turned 
against a religiously tolerant Cologne, and even the normally reserved Weinsberg could see that 
a confessionally defined city was the future. The authorities had to overcome the strenuous 
opposition of the three Gaffeln who faced the loss of their elected representatives in the 
government and as a result fought the decision in both local and imperial courts, but the 
council’s leadership refused to back down.150 The following year, the council rejected two more 
nominees, this time from the Goldschmidt and Aren Gaffeln, on the grounds that an investigation 
conducted personally by a Bürgermeister had failed to clearly identify their religious 
affiliation.151 The city’s leadership had chosen to side with their external Catholic allies and 
willingly faced the internal consequences, even if the influential sections of the populace 
expressed their displeasure with the result. For their part, the Catholic powers continued to keep 
a close eye on elections in Cologne for several years after this initial success, in order to ensure 
that the city would not backslide on its assurances.152 The city’s leadership had lost their trust 
over the previous decades and they steadfastly resolved to make it into a holy city in truth 
through a transformation of the government after their own image. While in Augsburg the 
council’s internal attempt to align with the city’s allies had ultimately upset the balance of 
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religious toleration, active intervention by Cologne’s neighbours brought about that city’s turn 
towards increased persecution. 
 Once again, a period of official vigilance against Protestants of both high status and low 
accompanied the foreign intervention. The influential politician Johann von Hardenrath, who 
frequently held the office of Bürgermeister in the final decades of the sixteenth century, in 
particular acted as an architect of this Counter-Reformation movement, which soon acquired 
majority support in the city council.153 The council thereafter pursued a religious purge of 
society, which included expulsions as well as social and religious programs, including the 
closure of the city brothel in 1594 and increased catechization.154 With the full weight of the 
government behind it, the metamorphosis of society proceeded quickly, and soon the Lutheran 
minority found themselves just as unwelcome as the Calvinists had less than a decade earlier. In 
1579, authorities uncovered a secret congregation of approximately one hundred Lutherans, and 
though they soon released many of the arrested, the ringleaders of the group faced imprisonment, 
interrogation, fines, and a compulsory oath to avoid future clandestine religious groups before 
they too regained their freedom.155 Other waves of persecution followed and pushed the 
Lutherans, like the Anabaptists and Calvinists before them, to the margins of society, though 
they survived in small numbers. As a result of these actions, Cologne experienced a re-
confessionalization socially as well as governmentally. 
Some citizens of course resisted Cologne’s new turn towards intolerance and though they 
ultimately found little success, they did generate a great deal of discussion about the place of 
Cologne in the Peace of Augsburg. In 1571, several of those arrested for Calvinist beliefs based 
their defence on the Religious Peace directly through the claim that they held to the Augsburg 
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Confession and thus fell under the protection of Article Twenty-Seven, but their prosecutors 
simply ignored such arguments.156 Whether they legitimately doubted the accused’s supposedly 
Lutheran faith or rejected the idea that Cologne fell under the category of confessionally mixed 
cities designated by the Peace, the magistrates made clear that they would not hesitate to 
disregard such appeals to the 1555 treaty if it stood in the way of their policy. In 1582, Johann 
Bruckman, Johann van Süchtelen, and Jaspar de Wedige tried an even more direct approach 
when they appealed the council to grant them the right to worship freely as Protestants.157 The 
council was unmoved. After the three men ignored a warning from the Bürgermeister to 
withdraw their petition or face potential reprisals, the administration quickly voted down the 
proposal.158 This case demonstrates that several prominent citizens felt both passionately enough 
about the status of Cologne as a religiously tolerant city and secure enough in their rights as 
citizens to directly challenge the administration’s new policy. In 1591, Johannes Bade took the 
argument for tolerance one step further; in response to his arrest for heresy, he argued that a free 
imperial city fundamentally differed from a principality in that the magistrates represented the 
people and, as an implication of that fact, he claimed they could not permanently determine the 
religious direction of the city.159 Through his use of such a defence, Bade effectively contended 
that a municipal government could never hold the right of cuius regio, eius religio, a point which 
the magistrates would never concede, but which did raise questions about the legitimacy of their 
policies. Cases such as these, while unsuccessful in the short term, do demonstrate that the ideas 
enshrined in the Peace of Augsburg had begun to trickle down into the ways the populace 
thought about religious coexistence and governance. 
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Cologne’s new religious intolerance also drew attention from the other Protestant states 
of the Holy Roman Empire, especially with regards to its legitimacy under the Peace of 
Augsburg. As early as August 1579, the Protestant estates appealed to the Emperor to rescind the 
demands of his commissioners and argued that the city’s tolerance up to that point demonstrated 
their willingness to act as a mixed confessional city if only he would offer his approval, but the 
petition fell through as a result of the Protestant party’s own internal disunity.160 Though 
undermined by the imperial politics of the day, this proposal demonstrates that the concept of 
religious coexistence still held appeal as a compromise solution. Indeed, the debate over 
Cologne’s legal obligations to the Peace did not end there. As the case developed in the imperial 
courts, the Protestants continued to argue that Cologne’s actions went against the terms of the 
Peace, while the Emperor insisted that as an imperial city, Cologne’s magistrates simply acted as 
an extension of his authority and thus his own right of reform.161 Cologne itself, naturally 
uncomfortable with the implications of both presented options, began to assert contrary to both 
arguments that while it did not fall under the Emperor’s direct control, the Protestant presence in 
the city had not existed in sufficient numbers in 1555 to qualify the city as a mixed confessional 
city under Article Twenty-Seven.162 While Cologne’s administration still supported the turn 
towards religious purity, it would not sacrifice its autonomy to achieve their goals, so it turned to 
the vagaries of the Peace itself for protection. As a result, the legal case deadlocked and 
eventually came to nothing, but in the process it proved that the Peace and its ideals still held 
sway in the minds of the Empire’s political elite. 
After the transformations of the 1570s, Cologne’s religious policy settled into a new 
pattern that primarily consisted of the repression but not elimination of its religious minority 
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groups. Small groups of Calvinists and Lutherans both continued to eke out an existence under 
the watchful gaze of the city council, but they faced many forms of persecution both direct and 
indirect. As late as 1595, Weinsberg could still record in his journal accounts of openly 
worshipping Protestants who had escaped the purges and still resided in Cologne, but he did not 
hesitate to note the political and social exclusion they experienced.163 As a magistrate himself, 
Weinsberg reflected the prevalent perception of religious minorities among the city leadership; 
he accepted their right to live in the city, but gave them little other allowances, with an attitude 
both uncharitable and dismissive. Furthermore, such dissidents still risked prosecution should the 
council judge them to have overstepped their bounds; in one period analyzed by Gerd 
Schwerhoff, 183 individuals, which amounted to 9.3% of all criminals brought before the courts, 
faced prosecution because of their religious beliefs.164 Given that such crimes applied to a 
community no larger than four thousand individuals, this means that more than one in twenty-
five Protestants experienced religious persecution first hand, which attests to simple fact: 
dissension in matters of faith made for a dangerous way of life. The Presbyterian Protocols of the 
Cologne Calvinist community, written by Eduard Simons, reveal the survival tactics employed 
by religious minorities in the city during this period; communities had to be small, tight-knit, and 
strongly disciplined in order to avoid the attention of the authorities.165 While this constituted 
religious coexistence of a sort, it fell well short of true tolerance. Catholicism remained the only 
acceptable religion in active Cologne society, for the policies of a confessionally-committed 
administration had pushed every other element to the margin. 
Not everything worked against Protestants in Cologne, however, for though the council 
remained vigilant against religious dissidents, their countermeasures against accused heretics 
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became significantly less harsh. From around the year 1588, those arrested for Lutheran beliefs 
no longer faced banishment but rather a simple fifty gold florin fine.166 Around the same time, 
the city leadership became somewhat more merciful towards Calvinists as well; in a one-year 
period from the middle of 1590 to the middle of 1591 authorities uncovered a number of secret 
Calvinist gatherings, but while a handful of leaders among the community faced imprisonment 
and a formal trial, the rest escaped with a fine.167 Such punishments aimed to discourage the 
active practice of non-Catholic faiths, but made no real attempt to convert dissidents. Similarly, 
Weinsberg notes in his journal that when it became known in 1595 that two sons of a prominent 
local aristocrat had become involved in Calvinist gatherings, they too received only a fine and a 
stern warning.168 Despite the scandal, this episode did not galvanize the council to take same 
extreme measures it had in the past. In truth, while the magistrates remained convinced of the 
Protestant threat to social order, the common people did not share their concerns, so while the 
council could keep a careful watch on suspicious individuals, it lacked the popular support 
necessary for a stronger campaign of repression.169 For those prepared to pay the very real social, 
economic, and political costs, life as a Protestant in Cologne was quite possible, if not pleasant. 
The expansion of religious tolerance in nearby Mülheim, which fell under the authority of 
the Dukes of Berg, provided another boon to the Protestant cause in the free imperial city. With 
this development, it became possible for committed Protestants to work in Cologne, but travel to 
Mülheim to worship and thus avoid any direct violation of Cologne’s religious codes.170 The 
arrangement had benefits not only for those religious dissidents who now had a new outlet for 
their faith, but also for the city’s economic prosperity, which may have suffered if the 
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administration’s policies had forced the local minorities, along with their expertise and wealth, 
out of the city altogether. However, the council did not sit by while its plans for civic religious 
purity were so blatantly undermined. In May of 1610, the council ordered a halt to travel in and 
out of the city on Sunday mornings and imposed of a new one hundred gold florin fine on any 
Cologne citizen caught at religious services in Mülheim.171 They hoped that this would stop 
movement between the two cities, but this proved overly optimistic: Mülheim’s proximity to 
Cologne and the ease of access that the Rhine provided made traffic all but impossible to control. 
Measures increased in severity over the next few years, but they did not translate into an 
effective deterrence; according to one contemporary chronicler, the magistrates still arrested 
eighty-four individuals for violations of the new legislation during its first two years.172 Despite 
their efforts, Cologne could not monitor everyone who came and went from the city, nor could it 
force its more tolerant neighbour to change its religious policy, so Cologne had to live with the 
resultant boost that Mülheim offered to Protestants in their own city. Here, too, niches opened up 
for those determined to carve out a life in the free imperial city despite allegiance to a faith that 
stood at odds with the local elite and the majority of the population. 
The stark difference between Cologne’s religious policy in the first two decades of the 
Peace of Augsburg and the subsequent several decades makes its response as a whole to the 
challenge of toleration presented by Article Twenty-Seven difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, 
as the Protestant estates argued in their appeal to the Emperor, Cologne’s leadership did at first 
demonstrate a definitively open stance towards religious diversity despite the uncertainty of its 
status as a confessionally mixed city under the Peace and the improbability of any repercussions 
should they have chosen to ignore it. On the other hand, the city’s aristocrats proved enthusiastic 
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participants in a program of persecution once offered the impetus by external interventions. 
Certainly by the time matters had settled into the new status quo established in the last decade of 
the sixteenth century, Cologne’s religious policy stood in direct violation of the terms set by the 
Peace of Augsburg, even if it allowed for small religious minorities to continue to exist in the 
shadow of mainstream society. As in Augsburg, the atmosphere of acceptance established in 
Cologne in the wake of the Peace could not survive the revival of confessional rivalries in the 
Holy Roman Empire, but Cologne also lacked the counterbalance of numerous and influential 
religious minorities. For this reason, Cologne swung even more dramatically towards intolerance 
and in the end came to fulfill the reputation for militant Catholicism that it had always sought to 
project. 
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Besieged Intolerance in Nuremberg 
 Nuremberg stands in stark contrast to both Augsburg and Cologne as a city that defiantly 
and resolutely resisted the least concession to the Peace of Augsburg throughout its sixty-three-
year duration. With a populace almost entirely loyal to the Lutheran faith, Nuremberg’s 
leadership faced no serious internal challenges to its position, as did Augsburg, and they also 
proved more unyielding in the face of external pressures than their counterparts in Cologne. 
These two factors combined to give Nuremberg’s religious policy a sense of confidence that the 
other two cities lacked. What tokens of toleration that the city council granted, it did so of its 
own volition, not because other actors either inside or outside the city forced its hand. In all, 
though the Peace of Augsburg did evoke many of the same challenges and issues in Nuremberg 
as in her sister-cities, it ultimately did not significantly impact the trajectory of the city as it 
developed into a fully confessionalized Protestant polity. 
 Much as it had in the early years of the Reformation, Nuremberg initially positioned itself 
as a firmly but not militantly Lutheran city. The city’s relationship with its monasteries offers a 
key example of this policy, for the magistrates allowed existing members of the religious orders 
to continue to live out their faith as they saw fit and even provided stipends for their expenses, 
but they refused to allow them to recruit any new members.173 With this policy, they avoided the 
public spectacle and potential unrest that uprooting such institutions would have caused, but they 
also guaranteed that the Catholic presence in the city would slowly die away. St. Katherine’s, the 
most enduring convent in Nuremberg, maintained particularly strong ties to the aristocracy; 
Sebald Welser, to offer one example, wrote of his visits to the cloister as a youth and continued 
to correspond warmly with “the worthy women of St. Katherine’s” long afterwards despite his 
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strong Protestant convictions.174 The nuns were quite literally family to the upper class and their 
powerful kinsmen readily ignored their religious dissension as long as they continued to make no 
trouble. As Strauss notes, in this matter as in all others, “what mattered most with the Council 
was the preservation of the city's security and internal autonomy,” so their religious policy could 
afford to give a little to avoid any offense to the nuns’ important supporters.175 In Nuremberg, the 
Lutherans had won a decisive victory, but they extended generosity in small ways to Catholic 
sympathizers once in unquestioned control of the city. 
 The free imperial city also maintained its policy of closeness with the Emperor despite 
their religious differences. Indeed, given the friction that had emerged through Charles V’s 
decision to impose the largely Catholic Interim on Nuremberg despite its loyal support during the 
Schmalkaldic War, the councillors saw the reestablishment of positive relations with his 
successor, Ferdinand I, as one of their most crucial tasks after the Peace of Augsburg.176 Because 
of the hostile Catholic environs that surrounded Nuremberg, the good will of the Emperor, who 
held in addition to his primary title several of the most powerful principalities in the region, 
could make the difference in the survival of the isolated city, so it is little wonder that one 
Nuremberg politician concluded that “it would no doubt be best for an honourable Council to be 
neutral and after God Almighty to trust in the Roman Emperor as the supreme Head.”177 This 
decision put them at odds with the rest of the Protestant states of the Empire and only enhanced 
the city’s reputation as a colluder with the enemy, but in truth Nuremberg had little choice. After 
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the destruction caused to Nuremberg and its neighbours by the Second Margrave War from 1552 
to 1555, the city simply lacked the strength necessary to defend itself, so they needed a powerful 
patron to protect them.178 Charles had broken the greater Protestant powers of the Empire and 
only fell short of complete dominance due to the intervention of his coreligionists in France, so 
only Catholic states had the power to provide protection to Nuremberg in those early years. In 
this regard, the Emperor represented the least distasteful of the city council’s options. Even when 
the Protestant estates began to recover and return to the main stage of imperial politics, 
Nuremberg sided with Elector Augustus of Saxony against any move towards a second 
Schmalkaldic League for fear that it would merely provoke new tensions between the faiths.179 
This too resulted from the city’s environment; of all the Protestant estates, the isolated and 
vulnerable Nuremberg could least afford a new escalation in confessionalization that would leave 
it on the front lines of the conflict. In these ways, Nuremberg maneuvered apart from most of its 
fellow Protestants and more in line with the Habsburgs when it came to the politics of the 
Empire. 
 Nevertheless, Nuremberg ably proved over the next several decades that these 
concessions to the reality of its geopolitical situation did not mean that it would give any further 
ground or compromise its internal religious consensus. Indeed, as proven by one of primary 
conflicts the city fought over religion, namely the issue of whether it would allow a revival of the 
local monasteries, Nuremberg prioritized its religious purity over its relationship with key 
neighbours, including the Emperor. In July 1559, Ferdinand summoned Nuremberg’s 
ambassadors to request that the magistrates allow a confessor to enter the city’s cloisters to “give 
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them the Holy Sacrament, and sometimes read a small Mass.”180 He further assured them that 
they need no make any public acknowledgement of the deed, as it could stand as a small personal 
favour to their liege.181 This could hardly have endangered the faith of the community as a whole 
and thus offered Nuremberg an opportunity to earn the goodwill of the Emperor at little cost, but 
even this failed to budge the council. When the council denied Ferdinand’s request formally in a 
response delivered on December 7, 1559, they argued that the nuns had no cause for complaint 
and that to allow Catholic services within the city would not only betray their consciences, but 
also the trust that the Lutheran citizenry had granted them.182 With the Interim only recently 
overturned, they had no desire to grant Catholicism the smallest foothold in the city again. In the 
next six years, the authorities seized both a monastery and a cloister after their last inhabitants 
passed away, which further diminished the presence of the old faith in Nuremberg.183 When it 
came to the faith of the city and its citizens, Nuremberg’s leadership had determined to champion 
the Protestant cause, and no amount of external pressure would change that mindset. 
 The greatest challenge to Nuremberg’s monastic policy came, ironically, with the 
extinction of the city’s final monastery, St. Katherine’s. After the death of the last resident, 
Cordula Knorr, the German provincial of the Order of Preachers, Konrad Zittardus, petitioned 
the free imperial city to allow new nuns to populate the cloister, but the council predictably 
refused.184 Aware of their precarious right to the convent under the terms of the Peace of 
Augsburg, the city claimed, contrary to any truth, that they had controlled St. Katherine’s prior to 
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the Peace.185 The Peace mandated that religious institutions remain in the hands of whichever 
confession controlled them prior to the conflicts of the mid-century, so such a claim, if accepted, 
would give the city legal ownership of the convent and thus the right to do with it as the council 
willed. Undeterred, Zittardus turned to the Emperor for justice and the latter duly commanded 
Nuremberg in late 1596 to hand over control of St. Katherine’s to the Catholic orders.186 This 
intervention of the Emperor drastically escalated the severity of the situation, as Nuremberg 
could not directly defy his will should he bring his full power to bear. The council, however, 
gambled that he would not and in its refusal to comply, it simply repeated its weak claim to the 
convent. Without more substantial evidence, this proved enough and despite the protests of both 
Zittardus and the nearby Bishop of Bamberg, the deadlocked case eventually folded in 1600.187 
The imperial courts lacked the power and influence to resolve the starkly polarized conflicts of 
the Reformation era, and so, in lieu of open war, sheer stubbornness often won out over even the 
most legitimate claims. The continued existence of the monasteries constituted a serious chink in 
the city’s armour under the Peace of Augsburg, but Nuremberg’s resolute defense against 
external pressures proved that a determined political actor could defy such pressures in the 
fractious atmosphere of the day.  
 Other attempts to crack Nuremberg’s confessional intransigence took the form of claims 
against already shuttered Catholic institutions in the city and its territory. Such 
“Revindikationsbestrebungen,” or revindication efforts, became a hallmark of the Counter-
Reformation in Germany and posed a repeated challenge to Nuremberg in particular through this 
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period and well into the Thirty Years’ War.188 In one 1561 case, the Bishop of Eichstätt 
demanded the right to rebuild the Pillenreuth cloister, which Albrecht Alcibiades of 
Brandenburg-Kulmbach had destroyed in the Second Margrave War.189 In essence, he claimed 
that because the convent had never officially passed out of Catholic hands, the faith still had the 
right to a religious institution in the region, which, if accepted, meant that Nuremberg had a legal 
obligation to reconstruct the convent. The magistrates of the city unsurprisingly contested this 
interpretation, less because they disputed the prelate’s version of events than because they saw 
such action as contrary to their Protestant convictions.190 The Peace contained no clear method 
for the arbitration of such grey areas and so they stood as open disputes, rarely resolved in any 
satisfactory way. As Nuremberg had proven in the case of St. Katherine’s, spurious claims could 
have as great an effect as honest ones, so the city also had to contend with Catholic attempts to 
reopen issues that it had thought closed for good. In this way, Nuremberg faced demands to pay 
reparations for the city’s former Carmelite cloister in 1560 and in 1570, though they rightly 
noted that they had legally purchased the building in 1557.191 In many ways, this period of 
Nuremberg history resembles a state of siege, in which the city adamantly defended its religious 
purity against seemingly innumerable attempts to undermine it. 
 Over the course of this period, Nuremberg’s intolerance of Catholic activities within its 
territories earned it the enmity of the Prince-Bishops of Bamberg, who had once held religious 
authority over the city. Despite the assurances of the Peace of Augsburg, which clearly stated 
that ecclesiastical jurisdictions should no longer apply to Lutheran states, Bamberg still saw itself 
as the protector of Catholics in Nuremberg, a conviction that almost drove the two to open war in 
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1562.192 The current bishop, Veit II, was not content to rely on legalistic attempts to restore 
Catholicism’s rights in the city and its environs, so he began to use his geopolitical influence to 
pressure Nuremberg. The Landsberger Bund attempted to resolve the issue, but quickly lost 
interest in mediation between the two member-states. After it ensured the release of several 
Nuremberg citizens arrested by the Prince-Bishop, the other constituent states abandoned their 
two associates to sort out their differences on their own.193 The obdurate parties continued to 
bicker over whose actions fell outside of the bounds of the Peace of Augsburg, a fact that 
underlines the treaty’s failure to propose a practical method with which to implement and defend 
the Peace. The conflict reached its climax when Veit excommunicated Nuremberg, a 
pronouncement that Nuremberg decried as “mischief” beyond his rightful jurisdiction.194 At 
Nuremberg’s request, the Emperor eventually stepped in and commanded Bamberg to withdraw 
its proclamation, which effectively end the dispute.195 Only this imperial intervention halted the 
march towards open warfare, which given the Emperor’s own religious commitments simply was 
not a feasible long term system for conflict management. The conflict reared its head once again 
towards the end of the century with the appointment of Neithard von Thüngen as Bishop of 
Bamberg in 1591. A wholehearted supporter of the Counter-Reformation in Germany, Neithard 
immediately began to re-implement his predecessor’s campaign of Catholicization; this time, he 
demanded that known Protestants within his territory return to the old faith or face the seizure of 
their goods and expulsion from Bamberg. 196 This time Nuremberg did not stand alone in their 
vehement protests against Bamberg’s heavy-handed religious policy, but the situation did not 
truly settle until Neithard’s death in 1598. This time the weaknesses of the Empire’s religious 
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systems worked against Nuremberg, as the advantage in religious disputes continued to lie with 
the current ruler of a given territory, even when he acted in direct violation of the Peace of 
Augsburg. The Bamberg-Nuremberg dispute over religion thus showcased the fragility of the 
Peace and how the Holy Roman Empire had begun its slide back towards confessionalization. 
 As with their approach to external politics, the magistrates of Nuremberg remained 
vigilant against any potential resurgence of Catholicism among their own citizenry. To that end, 
they sought to indoctrinate the populace of the city with a palpable distrust of anything Catholic, 
as demonstrated by the writings of Sebald Welser. Though his attitude later softened, even he, 
who had interacted firsthand with Catholics in the city, scorned the rituals and devotions he 
witnessed when he first left Nuremberg to pursue his studies abroad; he described one public 
Eucharist as a “deceit” of the Jesuits.197  The stark contrast this presents to both his positive 
opinion of the women of St. Katherine’s and his later willing participation in Catholic services 
effectively demonstrates the instinctive distrust of papal ceremony among the citizens of 
Nuremberg. In addition to their efforts to confessionalize the populace, the authorities kept a 
close eye on the convents while they still survived, suspicious that those Catholic sympathizers 
who remained in the city might gravitate towards such symbols of the old faith, and time proved 
that such fears had validity. In one instance, authorities apprehended and imprisoned several 
individuals who had attended masses intended only for the religious orders themselves.198 For the 
magistrates, the arrest of a handful of local dissidents represented a small sacrifice alongside the 
measures they had taken to prevent the revival of Catholicism among the citizenry. Nuremberg 
was no Cologne, posturing about intolerance to the world while practising tolerance at home; its 
leadership had and would continue to repress any Catholic element it detected in the city. 
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 Like her fellow free imperial cities of Augsburg and Cologne, Nuremberg also had no 
tolerance of or patience with the more radical movements of the Reformation. A group of 
Anabaptists that took after the radical Reformation leader Caspar Schwenckfeld caused the city’s 
leadership particular concern. The authorities did not hesitate to banish such groups of 
“Schwärmer,” a term roughly equivalent to “enthusiasts,” as soon as they uncovered them.199 
Johann Schröder, who served as the preacher at one of the local churches, played a central role in 
these purges and thereafter continued to keep a militant eye out for any clandestine radicals.200 
While Catholics represented the threat of the old order, Anabaptists and other radicals 
foreshadowed a potential breakdown of council authority in the other direction, towards religious 
individualism and, in the minds of the elite, anarchy. Even the followers of the renegade 
Lutheran Matthias Flacius, such as the preacher Johann Kaufmann, found themselves on the 
wrong end of expulsion orders as the council tried to maintain the communal religious purity of 
the city.201 In this action, the magistrates showed their determination to remain in control of the 
Reformation in Nuremberg, even if it meant the repression of a few of their less conservative 
brethren. At this point in church history, few polities showed any tolerance towards radical sects 
of Christianity, which still evoked a great deal of fear for their role in catastrophes like the 
Münster Rebellion, and in this regard Nuremberg was no exception. 
Notably, Nuremberg made an allowance within its policy of intolerance for one group of 
religious dissidents, namely their fellow Protestants the Calvinists. Like Cologne, Nuremberg 
saw the economic benefits of the exiles of the Low Countries could offer their city and even 
went so far as to offer them tax exemptions and other incentives to choose Nuremberg as their 
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new home.202 The Dutch Calvinists did not pose the existential threat to the Reformation as did 
Catholicism, nor did they reject the urban order in way that Anabaptism did, so the Nuremberg 
council gladly tolerated them for the material benefits their presence brought. Likewise, 
Nuremberg maintained strong relationships with nearby towns that harboured significant non-
Lutheran communities, including Fürth, which had an expanding Jewish minority, and Erlangen, 
which received a large influx of Huguenot residents.203 These adjacent towns served as 
extensions of Nuremberg’s workforce, and the city benefited the local religious minorities, but 
they did not have to directly accommodate their religious dissension and thus threaten the 
communal unity. The magistrates also did their best to avoid the various controversies within the 
Protestant camp through the years; in 1573 they adopted an all-inclusive creed as the religious 
standard of the city and several years later they refused to sign the Formula of Concord, which 
served to maintain this open stance towards all variations of Protestantism.204 The council might 
have envisioned itself as the defender of Lutheranism, but it had no particular attachment to any 
given faction within the faith. In these ways, Nuremberg and its patrician class remained loyal to 
Protestantism as a whole, but never involved itself too directly in the maintenance of any 
particular religious structure within that broader range. 
Nuremberg’s magistrates not only accepted the presence of non-Lutheran Protestants in 
the city, but also among their own number. One such figure, Christoph Hardesheim, became 
quite influential as a trusted consultant of the council despite his open Calvinism.205 Johann 
Herel, another notable Calvinist, also served in the Nuremberg government and after a successful 
career as a consultant rose as high as membership on the Great Council and a title among the 
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imperial nobility.206 Throughout Germany during this time period, governments began to require 
greater numbers of high-born, skilled, and educated individuals as they became more 
professionalized, and Nuremberg could not afford to turn away the services of two such men 
simply because their religious beliefs did not align perfectly with the rest of the city’s leadership; 
that their faith did not endanger the social order sufficed. Calvinists and other religious dissidents 
never made up more than a fraction of the city elite, however, so the presence of a handful in the 
highest bodies did little to impact policy directly. The patrician class of Nuremberg showed itself 
to have an open mind when it came to fellow Protestants, even when it came to membership in 
the most important government bodies, but this marked the limits of their toleration. 
Like Augsburg, Nuremberg stood out from the majority of its neighbours in terms of 
confession, so it too attempted to play the middle in an attempt to balance its religious interests 
with ties to important geopolitical allies. This eventually drove Nuremberg towards the relative 
safety of the non-confessional alliance known as the Landsberger Bund. While the Bund had no 
official position on religious toleration as an ideal, it did represent the promise of cooperation 
between the confessionally divided states of the Holy Roman Empire; even Duke Albrecht, who 
as the ruler of Bavaria represented the member-state most committed to the Counter-
Reformation, did not hesitate to state in 1569 that in the Bund “we make no distinction between 
the Catholics and the estates of the Augsburg Confession.”207 Given that Nuremberg needed to 
somehow maintain positive relationships with its predominately Catholic neighbours, this 
offered a prize worth the ideological cost. Nuremberg well understood the security benefits of 
membership in the Bund, as many of the most powerful states of southern Germany had already 
joined, and felt confident that it could resist the Catholic influences that might come from close 
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association with states of that faith.208 The main threat that membership in the Landsberger Bund 
posed to Nuremberg was the risk that it would enhance its reputation for collusion with the 
confessional enemy among its fellow Protestants, which had already grown strong enough for 
Augsburg, a city desperate to appease its Lutheran majority, to oppose its induction into the 
Bund in the first place. 209 Nevertheless, the city’s leadership ultimately decided that the cost did 
not outweigh the benefits of geopolitical safety. Though Nuremberg might have preferred to turn 
to the Protestant powers for protection, they were simply too far away and not powerful enough 
to influence Nuremberg’s immediate neighbours. These factors led Nuremberg down the path of 
extra-confessional alliance despite its established intransigence when it came to internal religious 
matters. 
Nuremberg soon found, however, that membership as a Protestant state in a 
predominantly Catholic alliance had significant downsides. For one, Augsburg’s fears quickly 
became reality as the Landsberger Bund gained an ugly reputation among the Protestant estates, 
who decried it as a “clerical conspiracy.”210 Through its membership, Nuremberg became tarred 
with the same brush and Protestant distrust of the free imperial city grew. In order to counteract 
this, Nuremberg pushed for the Bund to offer membership to more Protestant states, and 
advocated for the admittance of former members of the Swabian League, but over time this 
threatened to alienate it from the group as Protestant candidates continued to refuse offers due to 
the Bund’s reputation and the other members lost patience with Nuremberg’s repeated veto of 
potential Catholic candidates.211 Even Augsburg earned less ill will in this regard, for it had 
made its support conditional on the opinion of the Emperor, who acknowledged in 1571 that 
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Protestants would find the addition of more Catholic states “offensive” but did not view the 
situation with the same urgency as Nuremberg.212 Nuremberg’s insistence on a confessional 
balance in the Bund’s members, which stemmed from a desire not to antagonize valuable 
potential allies among the Protestant estates, only served to annoy its current allies; the combined 
effects of this push and pull put Nuremberg in a truly unenviable positon. Eventually it became 
evident to Nuremberg patrician Georg Volckamer that the Bund had split, perhaps irrevocably, 
into two parties over the issue of expansion, with only Austria, Augsburg, and Mainz in 
agreement with Nuremberg on the necessity of new Protestant members.213 Such divisions 
undermined the effectiveness of a non-binding association that had already proven reluctant to 
intervene in times of crisis like the Bamberg-Nuremberg conflict and still did little to address the 
dark suspicions of the Bund that already existed in the Protestant camp despite the best efforts of 
the more irenic members to alleviate their fears.214 Ultimately, the Bund could not shake its 
negative reputation among the non-Catholic states, which greatly diminished its ability to act as a 
point of cooperation between the two camps as Nuremberg had hoped. The chasm between 
confessions during the Reformation yawned too wide and Nuremberg’s attempts to span it only 
made the city more isolated in a time of great polarization.  
Eventually the free imperial city’s leadership decided that such a close association with 
the Catholic states of the Empire was simply not tenable in the long term. Bavaria’s ever-
strengthening commitment to the Counter-Reformation in particular soured Nuremberg on the 
Bund and it began to withdraw from active participation.215 The two states’ inability to 
compromise on something so fundamental to their identity put them constantly at odds, which 
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undermined the incentives for Nuremberg remain a part of the Bund in the first place. However, 
even though Nuremberg had never had any interest in participation in a confessional conflict, 
and had repeatedly threated to leave the Bund should it break out, the city now had to fear that its 
very departure from the Bund could lead to such a conflict, as to this point Nuremberg had acted 
as its “Protestant figurehead and alibi for neutrality.”216 This worry kept Nuremberg in the Bund 
for a time as its diplomats tried to play peacemaker between the two confessions. Eventually, 
however, membership in the Bund and neutrality in the religious struggles of the Empire became 
mutually exclusive, and at that point Nuremberg took its leave from the alliance.217 Not long 
after, the Bund itself collapsed, as it no longer filled any role that an openly Catholic league 
could not play better. In order to replace the geopolitical security the Bund had offered, 
Nuremberg had to turn to the only other bloc of real influence in the Empire, and in May of 1609 
the free imperial city formally joined the Protestant Union.218 Unable to make a place for itself as 
a neutral party in the conflict between confessions, Nuremberg chose the side of its brethren in 
faith rather than that of its historic allies and close neighbours. After an experiment decades long, 
Nuremberg had decided that in foreign affairs as in internal matters, a confessionally-exclusive 
policy would better serve the interests of the city. 
During the more than six-decade duration of the Peace of Augsburg, Nuremberg 
consistently defied its nudges towards toleration and instead chose the path of pure 
Protestantism, if not pure Lutheranism. Outside of a handful of convents that soon died out, 
Catholics did not have the freedom to worship that the Peace of Augsburg mandated and indeed 
the authorities openly persecuted any such individuals they could find. Efforts by other states 
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who believed Nuremberg to have violated the Peace repeatedly failed to soften the city’s stance 
against Catholics through the simple expedience of the city’s stubborn refusal to compromise. 
Where the free imperial city showed any modicum of toleration, it came about not because of the 
Peace, but because the magistrates saw advantages for the city in toleration, whether due to 
economic factors, as in the case of the Dutch Calvinist resettlement, or political gains, as they 
hoped the Landsberger Bund would provide. It is therefore difficult to see the Peace as anything 
more than an abject failure in the case of Nuremberg, which remained unwaveringly committed 
to the Protestant cause and the Protestant cause alone throughout the Reformation era. 
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The Peace of Augsburg in Three Cities 
 When one takes a step back from the specific examples of Augsburg, Cologne, and 
Nuremberg and compares the three histories, it becomes possible to trace the predominant 
themes in the implementation of the Peace of Augsburg and particularly Article Twenty-Seven in 
the free imperial cities as a whole. In order to analyze the successes and failures of this attempt 
to create a new space for toleration in the Holy Roman Empire, this paper looks at three stages in 
the development of toleration. First, one must ask whether authorities intentionally allowed 
religious minorities to exist in these cities or whether their presence simply reflects an inability 
to fully execute a policy of intolerance, since the latter certainly does not fulfill the goals set out 
in the Peace. After this initial acceptance, however, a polity must also introduce certain 
structures and safeguards in order for this state of coexistence to endure for any length of time. In 
his larger study of religious toleration in early modern Europe, Benjamin Kaplan proposes a list 
of five key factors that allowed some mixed communities to exist in peace and, where lacking, 
led others to collapse into confessional conflict: 
“(1) security guarantees that eliminated both the threat of persecution and the 
prospect of persecuting others; (2) rigid, detailed regulations that limited what the 
confessions could fight over; (3) parity between confessions, so that one could not 
rule over the other(s); (4) autonomy for each confession to govern its internal 
affairs without interference; and (5) legal mechanisms for adjudicating disputes 
impartially."219 
Finally, this paper also asks one question not directly posed by the Peace of Augsburg: did 
biconfessionalism ever progress beyond simple cohabitation of two distinct religious and social 
groups to the point of where two confessions formed a single harmonious community? 
Obviously, it is difficult to quantify such a transition, but glimpses of it show through the ways 
in which both the city elite and the populace conceptualized the situation and talked about the 
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opposite faith. Such hallmarks include whether the elite and citizenry viewed the Peace as a 
temporary stopgap measure or the new state of affairs and whether the two communities mixed 
freely or held themselves apart from one another. Together, these three sets of criterion can 
indicate whether the Peace of Augsburg failed to achieve its stated goals, effectively 
implemented them, or even surpassed its original function. 
Perhaps the Peace of Augsburg’s greatest unmitigated success came through the 
introduction of the idea that religiously diverse cities could exist even in the confessionally-
charge atmosphere of Reformation era Germany. Before Luther’s challenge to the religious 
establishment, the idea of a knowing accommodation of heresy hardly entered into the 
conversation, and even in the subsequent decades few individuals, from kings all the way down 
to peasants, accepted the split in Christendom as anything more than temporary. That notion 
began to fade over time, especially in the war-torn Holy Roman Empire, but even the Peace of 
Augsburg simply enshrined the current division of principalities as a necessary consequence of 
the right of rulers to decide which faith to embrace – except in the case of the free imperial cities. 
Such made it possible for a recognized government like the Augsburg city council to issue their 
declaration that "past events and daily experiences make it obvious to everyone what unity and 
good follow from peaceful and friendly cohabitation,” a concept that almost no other state in 
Europe could have officially endorsed at the time.220 Furthermore, this ideal did not begin and 
end with the authorities, but trickled down into the minds of everyday citizens, such as in the 
cases of David Weiss, a patrician, and Georg Müller, a pastor, both of whom identified 
Augsburg’s later troubles not with the Peace but violations of that agreement.221 Such individuals 
might never have encountered theological arguments in favour of toleration, such as those 
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advanced in intellectual circles by Erasmus, Castellio, and others, but they could look around and 
decide for themselves that the Peace held enough of a promise of confessional peace to be worth 
preservation. In Cologne, Johannes Bade took the idea of religious toleration one step further and 
made it synonymous with the very notion of a free imperial city when he argued in his 
interrogation that the magistrates of such polities could only reflect and not shape the views of 
the citizenry.222 Here stands evidence of at least one case in which a resident of the free imperial 
city took what he had experienced and extrapolated it into something far greater than what the 
Peace had proposed. While the Peace certainly did not create the idea of religious coexistence, it 
did introduce it as a viable possibility into the minds of ordinary people, who could in turn shape 
the way future generations thought about toleration. 
Beyond simple ideals, however, the historical record also clearly indicates that religious 
minorities did continue to survive in each of Augsburg, Cologne, and Nuremberg, albeit to 
different extents and under different degrees of legality. Augsburg offers the most clear-cut case 
of religious coexistence, in which a Lutheran majority and a Catholic minority both enjoyed 
open freedom of worship throughout the period prior to the Thirty Years’ War and beyond. 
While in practice council elections produced fewer and fewer Lutheran magistrates, the city 
never passed any legislation that overtly restricted the rights of either religious group, nor did the 
two confessions ever do more to oppress one another than jockey for power and control. In 
Cologne, Lutherans and Calvinists did not achieve a similar degree of equality with the majority 
Catholics, but authorities still officially embraced them as part of the community into the 1570s 
and even beyond that period of persecution knew of and continued to grudgingly accept their 
presence in the city. Even in Nuremberg, the least tolerant of the three, the extant Catholic 
monasteries had the official approval of the authorities to exist if not to recruit, while Calvinists 
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enjoyed the freedom to live, work, and even govern in the city. Whether as official citizens or 
unsanctioned inhabitants, each case in this range of examples demonstrates a notable increase in 
the ability of religious minorities to live and worship in the city, at least in the initial period 
immediately after the Princes’ War. Therefore one must conclude that the Peace did usher in a 
period of religious coexistence in the free imperial cities at the very minimum. 
However, the Peace did fail in one important respect even at this early stage in the 
establishment of religious coexistence: it did not clearly define which cities should consider 
themselves bound by the principles of Article Twenty-Seven, nor did it state what rights cities 
outside of the mixed confessional categorization had in matters of faith. Of the three cities under 
examination, only Augsburg, a city with a large minority that made up a substantial portion of 
the local elite, existed in a clearly defined category, since Ferdinand had written the clause with 
just such a case in mind. One the other hand, Cologne languished for decades in a grey zone of 
legality, in which no clear consensus existed as to whether it fitted the category of a 
confessionally mixed city. The issue of timing further muddled the question; while Cologne had 
very little in the way of a Protestant population in 1555, the authorities allowed that community 
to grow freely in subsequent years, to the point where at its height it made up a full tenth of the 
population. This led to a number of legal battles fought at the imperial level over whether 
Cologne had the right or even, as some Catholic powers would have had it, the obligation to 
supress Protestant worship within the city, or if instead the Peace made such persecution illegal, 
as the Palatinate and its supporters vigorously argued.223 Thus the city council had to create its 
religious policy under immense pressure from both sides of the confessional divide and with no 
clear guidelines beyond the desire to appease its most important allies, which eventually led the 
magistrates to side with the Catholics and place themselves outside of Article Twenty-Seven’s 
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jurisdiction. Even then, citizens like Bade continued to dispute the legitimacy of that decision 
and insist that they had a right to peaceful coexistence, though the authorities did their best to 
silence such dissidents. In this environment of uncertainty, the Peace did very little to direct the 
development of the city’s religious policy; the council still made the decision between tolerance 
and intolerance, just as they would have under cuius regio, eius religio. The failure of religious 
coexistence in Cologne therefore directly relates to the failure of the authors of the Peace to 
clearly stipulate the intended jurisdiction of Article Twenty-Seven. 
Nuremberg did not experience the same degree of confused identification under the Peace 
of Augsburg, in part because of the clear dominance of Lutheranism within the city and in part 
because its magistrates never conceded any rights to their religious minorities, but the city still 
became involved in several lengthy debates about what obligations it held to Catholicism under 
the treaty. The monasteries provided one obvious sore point, as they not only represented a 
persistent Catholic presence in the city, but also brought to the fore questions of ownership and 
control, such as when Konrad Zittardus tried to reclaim and revive St. Katherine’s. The legal 
case did not challenge Nuremberg’s right to maintain the religious status quo within their 
territory, but it did question whether the city could further reform its lands through the seizure of 
defunct Catholic property. Similar issues fueled the Revindikationsbestrebungen throughout the 
Holy Roman Empire, since the Peace did not clearly delineate the right of reform, but the free 
imperial cities faced a unique challenge beyond even this, namely the question of whether they 
even possessed such a right. This ambiguity arose because of a key omission, for when 
Ferdinand wrote Article Twenty-Seven into the Peace to allow for biconfessionalism in some 
free imperial cities, he failed to state what should happen in those cities that did not fall into that 
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category, a fact which did not go unnoticed in the years to follow.224 As a result, mono-
confessional cities like Nuremberg existed in a kind of limbo state, neither forced to accept 
religious diversity nor confirmed in their right to supress it. Bamberg likewise used the 
uncertainty created by the Peace to claim that despite Nuremberg’s accepted turn towards the 
Protestant camp, it retained its religious jurisdiction over the Catholics in Nuremberg’s territory 
and thus had the right to use its political might to defend them. This assertion had no basis in the 
written terms of Article Twenty-Seven, and indeed contradicted another article of the Peace, but 
it nevertheless lingered unresolved until a new religious conflict could tear down the present 
order and attempt to construct a more defined solution. As the example of Nuremberg thus 
demonstrates, the state of limbo between true biconfessionalism and the full right of cuius regio, 
eius religio extended not only to cities like Cologne that had substantial religious minorities, but 
even to cities that most considered outside of the bounds of Article Twenty-Seven, which further 
undermined its ability to establish a peaceful status quo between the confessions. 
This early failure of the Peace had ripple effects throughout its implementation and 
duration as the law of the land. As long as uncertainty endured, beyond a few cases, as to which 
cities Ferdinand had meant to refer to in Article Twenty-Seven and which he had not, it remained 
possible for any city to throw off its obligations simply through the expedience of a denial of 
their validity. Furthermore, the cities themselves stood on unstable ground as long as the 
interpretation of the Peace in the wider political environment of the Holy Roman Empire 
remained open to reinterpretation, and so even if they held a genuine commitment to their 
original stance on toleration, their implementation might have to change dramatically in response 
to external shifts. All in all, the Peace did achieve something notable in its creation of a space for 
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religious toleration, but the breadth and longevity of that space was anything but certain even in 
its earliest days. 
The Peace of Augsburg’s methods for the establishment of the conditions of a durable 
confessional peace contained still more holes that undermined its effectiveness. Of Kaplan’s five 
criteria, the Peace only provided a basic framework for security guarantees and mechanisms for 
redress, and furthermore completely failed to address the issues of regulation, parity, and 
autonomy. This intensified the uncertainties around confessional coexistence and in many cases 
served to undercut whatever gains the Peace had initially achieved. As a result, religious 
toleration never gained a foothold in Nuremberg, soon disappeared in Cologne, and became 
severely embattled, though never eliminated, in Augsburg. The vague structures of the Peace 
thus doomed it to failure in the long run before the free imperial cities had even begun to 
implement it.  
Because the Peace did not directly specify a method of enforcement, communal 
intervention at the imperial level provided the only assurance of protection against illegitimate 
persecution in the free imperial cities. However, given the divisive nature of confessional 
struggles, such a system could not guarantee that the intervening powers would act in an 
unbiased and neutral manner, as indeed the history of this period proved. As one of the more 
stable biconfessional cities, Augsburg and its citizens rarely had to call upon outside assistance 
for the protection of their religious rights, but when they did so, the results demonstrated that 
imperial politics could eventually produce a solution, but not without many years of strife 
between the confessional camps. Augsburg experienced this phenomenon most directly in the 
Kalenderstreit, which saw the Protestant estates uniformly support the grievances of the populist 
Lutheran revolt while the Catholic powers defended the actions of their coreligionists on the 
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council. Rather than resolve the claims that the new calendar infringed on the religious rights of 
the Protestant majority, this simply served to fan the flames of the conflict, which lasted for years 
longer as a result. Even when the imperial commission became involved, the citizenry at first 
refused to accept the negotiated solution, as they viewed the process as inherently biased towards 
the Catholics. Without a clearly designated body to maintain the terms of the Peace, such 
scenarios led to periods of extended chaos which left the whole system of religious coexistence 
in jeopardy. Though biconfessionalism in Augsburg did survive a number of challenges, in part 
because of the intervention of other states in the Holy Roman Empire, a more defined system of 
safeguards might have allowed the city to escape these episodes sooner or perhaps avoid them 
altogether. 
Cologne also experienced a number of foreign interventions, but unlike Augsburg, its 
neighbours and allies sought not to preserve biconfessionalism, but to quash it. The Catholic 
powers argued that Cologne had not met the conditions of a mixed confessional status at the 
ratification of the Peace, and so it had no right to open religious stance that it had adopted. While 
such a claim had its merits, the events which followed from that stance demonstrated many of 
the greatest weaknesses of the protections put in place by the Peace. Through the use of proxies 
like the Duke of Alba and the imperial commission of 1579, the Habsburgs forced this 
interpretation of the Peace upon Cologne over the protests of a weakened Protestant party and 
reshaped the city after their vision of a Catholic bastion in the Empire’s northwest. Though 
Cologne’s magistrates eventually shook off claims of direct imperial authority over the city, they 
never again returned the heights of toleration experienced during those first few decades. This 
constituted the primary flaw in the Peace’s method of protecting religious coexistence: a free 
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imperial city had no method of recourse when the threat to the Peace was the very forces that it 
had charged with its preservation. 
On the other side of the issue, Nuremberg, although much less tolerant than the other two 
cities in an absolute sense, demonstrated that the mechanisms of the Peace had the power to 
affect even the most intransigent of free imperial cities. While the magistrates ably fended off 
attempts to revive St. Katherine’s and the other local Catholic institutions, their survival for 
nearly four decades speaks to what Kaplan calls “the enduring protection” of the Peace.225 In a 
city that prided itself on the pure and faithful Lutheranism of its citizenry, these few enclaves of 
Catholicism stood out as a visible sign of the limits of the city council’s power. Furthermore, 
Nuremberg’s accountability to the imperial courts gave Catholics such as Zittardus an avenue for 
redress, albeit an imperfect one, that simply could not have existed outside of the context of the 
Peace. Such protections may not have successfully compelled the free imperial city to adopt a 
more tolerant attitude towards Catholicism, but Nuremberg did have to take the threat of imperial 
intervention seriously, which forced it to walk the line between full submission and open 
defiance. Through the comparison of the three cities’ experiences with the safeguards of the 
Peace, one must conclude that they did have a certain power, but their lack of clear guidelines 
and controls against bias severely weakened their effectiveness. 
The imperial courts also held the primary responsibility for the adjudication of disputes 
over Article Twenty-Seven, but their association with the Catholic estates through the Habsburgs 
similarly tainted their involvement with the spectre of bias and left them with little power to 
effect proactive change. Indeed, while imperial legal mechanisms frequently issued rulings in 
cases of suspected violations of the Peace, the Protestant estates demonstrated in several 
instances that they had no way to actually enforce their judgements. In this way the unrest of the 
                                                          
225 Kaplan, Divided by Faith, 208. 
 
 
88 
 
Kalenderstreit in Augsburg continued through one mandated resolution handed down by an 
imperial commission, while in the face of a direct order to hand over control of St. Katherine’s 
Nuremberg simply refused to acknowledge a battle lost and continued to insist on the city’s legal 
ownership of the convent until the case lapsed. In light of these frequent struggles to have their 
verdicts recognized, the imperial courts carried little weight as an adjudicating body, which 
naturally complicated any attempts to resolve religious conflicts peaceably. Thus at the level of 
states one must conclude that the Peace failed to supply an adequate mechanism for impartial 
judgment.  
 However, the ordinances of the Peace itself did have some long-term impact on smaller 
legal cases that concerned issues of toleration, as well as on social perceptions of legitimate 
political action. Most notably, several extant cases exist of individual citizens in the free imperial 
cities who cited the Peace and Article Twenty-Seven in order to defend their legal right to 
religious coexistence. The most notable instance of this comes from Cologne’s 1571 wave of 
persecution against suspected Calvinists, some of whom defended their actions through the claim 
that they owed their loyalty not to the Reformed faith but rather to the Augsburg Confession and 
thus had a legal right to their religious freedom.226 This points to a simple and yet profound fact: 
these citizens believed that if they could convince their interrogators that they were Lutheran, 
they would come under the protection of the Peace. Given that Cologne had never expressly 
declared itself a mixed confessional city, this leap suggests that ordinary citizens had enough 
awareness of its clauses to seek protection in them. Similarly but more obliquely, the anonymous 
Protestant author of a 1583 letter of protest pointedly questioned “what sort of peace” the 
Augsburg magistrates sought to keep through the imposition of the new calendar in his 
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accusation that they aimed at a Catholic restoration in the city.227 Likewise, David Weiss did not 
directly call upon Article Twenty-Seven in his testimony before the imperial commission, but he 
did accuse the Augsburg council of having “impeded” Protestant worship and thus upsetting the 
balance between confessions that the Peace had constructed.228 In both cases, citizens of 
Augsburg based their accusations of governmental overstep on standards of behaviour 
established by the Peace, which further speaks to its influence all the way down to the everyday 
in the free imperial cities. Without unbiased adjudication and protection, the Peace did not have 
the clout to perfectly implement the changes that it promised, but the fact that individuals 
believed in its influence did give it a certain degree of soft power.  
Beyond the mixed results produced by the Peace’s systems for protection of minorities 
and adjudication, however, its implementation was also flawed by its complete omission of any 
provisions for regulations, parity, and autonomy. Since the Peace simply stated that “each party 
shall leave the other to maintain in a peaceful and orderly fashion its religion, faith, usages, 
ordinances, and ceremonies,” opinions on what aspects of life fell under its protection ranged 
widely.229 Indeed, this problem formed the basis for the entire Kalenderstreit, as the council 
argued that the new calendar had nothing to do with religion, while the Protestant populace saw 
the changes it imposed on religious holidays and other observances as a fundamental threat to 
their liberty. If the two confessions in a single city could not agree on what constituted 
reasonable religious coexistence, what hope existed for a wider consensus on the issue? 
Furthermore, this overreach of the Peace hugely complicated attempts to resolve the conflict, for 
as Scott Dixon puts it, “no compromise or simultaneum could neutralize a disagreement over 
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something so fundamental to notions of order as the passage of time.”230 Although in the chaos 
of the Kalenderstreit the city did function under the observation of two different calendars, this 
could not serve as a feasible solution in the long-term, so any resolution had to address this gulf 
between the two parties. Without a clear delineation of what aspects of everyday constituted a 
religious right, the implementation of the Peace lacked consistency and struggled to address the 
more uncommon confessional conflicts.  
The Peace also made no mention of how biconfessionalism should impact governmental 
structures. This was an intentional oversight on the part of the Habsburgs, as Charles and 
Ferdinand saw the city councils of the free imperial cities as a key staging ground for a Catholic 
resurgence, but it nonetheless produced many problems for the maintenance of the Peace in the 
long term.231 In Cologne and Nuremberg, the magistracy made no pretense to confessional parity 
and remained under the control of the dominant confession from before the Peace. Without this 
important element of stable religious coexistence, their respective councils had the freedom to 
pass less than even-handed laws without any accountability within the city. Cologne’s Catholic 
allies implicitly acknowledged this fact when they forced the city to purge its government of 
Protestants in 1579, and indeed, Cologne’s more militant Catholic aristocrats swept to power in 
the wake of this change. In the absence of a more temperate voice in the administration, the 
previous acceptance of religious diversity evaporated, replaced by an atmosphere of vigilant 
intolerance. If anything, the lack of parity in Augsburg and the other free imperial cities more 
evenly divided by confession had even graver repercussions. In the initial decades of the Peace 
the influence of the two faiths within the government waxed and waned freely, but such a 
balance proved unstable in the long run; before long the Fugger-led pro-Catholic faction 
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acquired a stranglehold over the council and did not relinquish it until the Thirty Years’ War. 
The correlation between this shift and the sudden increase in confessional conflicts did not go 
unnoticed, for from the halls of patrician homes all the way down to the common taverns 
Protestant-sympathetic voices spoke out against the new religious bias of the council.232 From 
this point onward, confessional coexistence in Augsburg depended entirely on the goodwill of 
the Catholic council and their reluctance to provoke the dissatisfaction of Protestants local and 
foreign, a state of affairs which did maintain the most obvious elements of toleration but exposed 
the community to any number of small manipulations of the confessional balance. Intentional or 
not, the Peace’s surrender of any control over the religious makeup of the free imperial cities’ 
governments made all of its achievements incredibly vulnerable to abuses of office when city 
councils became confessionalized.  
The ability of religious minorities to handle their own affairs proved a tricky matter in the 
environment of early modern Europe, as no separation of church and state yet existed, and yet 
Article Twenty-Seven also did nothing in address this critical issue. This most directly impacted 
Augsburg and the other openly biconfessional cities, which continued to treat the priesthood and 
other religious positions as a form of public office and thus a position under the auspice of the 
city council. Once Anton Christoph Rehlinger ascended to the office of Stadtfleger and gave the 
militant Catholic faction decisive control over the government, they used this fact to meddle with 
the internal affairs of the Protestant church. The imperial commission of 1584 records David 
Weiss’ extensive and bitter complaints on this very point: 
“Before, the church elders searched for [new] preachers, examined them in the 
council of ministers, and presented them to an Honorable Council. Now the 
mayors do it, and even Doctor Tradel himself, whose religion isn’t known, since 
he doesn’t go to any church and doesn’t take communion. The preacher 
[Johannes] Ehinger, who was most recently appointed based on Doctor Tradel’s 
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recommendation, is such an unlearned man that he isn’t qualified to be here. He, 
David Weiss, could preach better than this Ehinger.”233 
With the power to appoint their own candidates to the most important positions within the local 
Lutheran church, the Catholics of Augsburg could undermine their confessional rivals without 
the need to openly defy the Peace. Whether or not such actions fell under the contemporary 
definition of persecution, they certainly represented a major flaw in the way Article Twenty-
Seven had constructed religious coexistence. Ironically, more covert religious movements such 
as the Lutheran and Calvinist communities in Cologne enjoyed more freedom in this regard, as 
they had no open places of worship to be regulated by the authorities. Due to their small numbers 
and the tight discipline that persecution had forced upon them, Protestant leaders had much more 
effective control over the religious aspects of everyday life than their Catholic counterparts.234 
This increased autonomy as compared to other religious minorities, however, came only through 
persecution, so one can hardly credit the achievement to the Peace. Regardless of the scenario, 
the 1555 treaty gave no input on the issue of the independence of the churches from potentially 
biased local governments, to the clear detriment of the stability of confessional coexistence.  
 When evaluated by Kaplan’s five criteria, the terms of Article Twenty-Seven clearly fall 
well short of adequate for the task of maintaining the religious peace’s effectiveness in the free 
imperial cities over the long term. With only imperfect methods for the adjudication of disputes 
and protection against abuses combined with a blithe unconcern for clear bounds, governmental 
parity, or confessional autonomy, the Peace could do little to address the major challenges of 
religious coexistence, whether they took the form of Augsburg’s gradual confessionalization, 
imperial interference in Cologne, or the stubborn refusal of Nuremberg to comply with its 
regulations. As such, the confessional balance in the free imperial cities perennially 
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demonstrated its fragility and by the time of the Peace of Westphalia, it survived in only four of 
their number. 
 However, the Peace’s failure in the long term does not necessarily preclude its potential 
to encourage genuine toleration in the short term, so one must analyze this aspect on its own 
merits. In essence, the question is this: when two religious communities had to coexist in the 
same space, did they accept this state of affairs and mix freely with one another, or did they hold 
themselves apart and look for any opportunity to circumvent statutes of toleration? Since the 
authors of Peace did not seek to legislate such a deep integration of biconfessionalism into 
society, nor would they have even if they could, each individual free imperial city experienced 
this aspect of coexistence in their own unique way. Overall, what seems evident from the 
histories of Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Cologne is that in absence of religious conflict true 
toleration lay well within the realms of possibility, for as Michelle Hanson puts it, “it took a 
combination of factors, not religious difference alone, to motivate hostility.”235 However, in the 
face of the confessional pressures of the day, which fused religious issues with political, social, 
and economic concerns, this state of concord could collapse in a sudden and dramatic fashion. 
Therefore, in this area as well the Peace constituted only a mixed success. 
 In order to truly understand Augsburg’s experience of religious coexistence, one must 
divide its history into two periods, for the Kalenderstreit marked a major turning point in how the 
confessions viewed and interacted with one another. Before that outburst of hostility, peacefully 
intermingled society was the order of the day. The two faiths shared the same schools and 
welfare systems, participated in government together, and even intermarried, which reflected the 
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general if not total cooperation and harmony between the confessions.236 Confession seemed not 
to form a key part of everyday identity, for the two religions did not hold themselves as definably 
separate communities. Some citizens did of course continue to hold a strong antipathy towards 
the religious other, but this proved more the exception than the rule and outward manifestations 
of these tensions remained rare in the early days.237 For the most part, therefore, the citizenry of 
Augsburg exercised a genuine attitude of toleration towards the religious other in this period 
immediately after the Peace. 
 All of this changed in the early 1580s after the Catholics swept to power in the council 
and the citizenry became divided over the institution of the new calendar. Not only did social 
institutions become segregated, but the citizenry began to internalize their separate confessional 
identities and reflect them in highly personal ways like their choice of names.238 With differences 
of religion so readily apparent, Augsburg began to separate into two communities within the 
same set of walls. Politics also underwent a process of confessionalization, as not only did 
parties divide based on religious conviction, but leaders also used theology to justify their 
positions.239 Faith therefore began to define all aspects of an individual’s life within the city, a 
state bound to provoke distrust of those so completely different from oneself. However, just as 
some held to intolerant outlooks during the first stage of the Peace in Augsburg, tolerant attitudes 
remained possible during this latter period, though individuals with such beliefs dwindled in 
number and could be found for the most part only in the city’s elite.240 Due to the fact that the 
rhetoric of the city had become so thoroughly confessionalized and the populace so divided, 
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most accepted that the faiths would never reconcile their differences. Thus if the 1560s and 
1570s represented a time of unprecedented religious toleration, the later years of the Peace 
demonstrated an equally intense period of confessional division. 
 Cologne underwent a very similar process of confessionalization to Augsburg, in which 
Catholics and Protestants enjoyed relatively cordial relations in the first decades after the Peace, 
only to see tensions rise in the 1580s. Initially, the faiths maintained only very fluid boundaries, 
for many among the elite did not yet see the breakdown of Christian unity as permanent.241 
However, as in Augsburg, a more militantly Catholic faction came to power, in this case with 
outside assistance, and moved the city towards a period of general intolerance. Hermann 
Weinsberg stands as a prime example of this shift; as late as 1579 he recorded an account of a 
friendly religious debate with a Calvinist named John Tonberg, but by 1595 his perspective had 
shifted such that he castigated the impoverished Protestant Diederich Forst for his “wretchedness 
and corruption.”242 Weinsberg was by no means an alarmist on the topic of religion, but even he 
eventually absorbed the hostility of the environment as it became more polarized. Ironically, the 
authorities’ successful isolation of the Protestants within society seems to have diminished the 
fear of and aggression towards such groups, since over time the discovery of secret gatherings of 
religious dissidents provoked less alarm and less violent reprisals.243 Therefore, even more so 
than Augsburg, Cologne’s experience reinforces the impression that confessional friction in the 
everyday was more the product of social conflicts than their source. 
 Although Nuremberg for the most part evaded the Peace’s requirement for the 
accommodation of religious minorities and thus had little opportunity to demonstrate toleration 
in the everyday, certain facets of the citizenry’s attitude towards the religious other still offer 
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valuable insights into the issue. As the case of Sebald Welser shows, hostile attitudes to the idea 
of Catholicism did not necessarily extend to interactions with individual Catholics, though few 
outside of the aristocracy had the chance to interact with the monastery residents. Catholicism as 
a larger idea posed an existential threat to Nuremberg’s identity, but individual adherents of the 
religion represented a lesser danger, so they did not draw the same belligerent reaction. To use 
the words of Alexandra Walsham, “abstract hatred of a false religion as a system of thought was 
by no means incompatible with cordial relations with its human adherents. People might exhibit 
a profound opposition and aversion to a rival faith without translating this into a practical distaste 
of or destructive action against those who professed it."244 In addition, for all of the magistrates’ 
vigilance against a Catholic resurgence, they made no clear distinction between themselves and 
other Protestant groups, up to and including those Calvinists who sat on the council with them. In 
this area, Nuremberg actually exceeded Augsburg and Cologne in tolerance, as neither of its 
sister-cities ever allowed a Calvinist to take part in their leadership. This attitude of toleration in 
the ordinary facets of life had little impact on the direction of the city, but it does hint that given 
the opportunity, the citizenry of Nuremberg possessed a more generous attitude towards religious 
diversity than the council’s policies might suggest. 
 The Peace of Augsburg did not ultimately usher in a revolution of interreligious 
acceptance, for the tolerant atmosphere proved highly fragile and prone to disruption. Nor did 
these communities ever accept a full range of religious acceptance even at the heights of their 
diversity, for each enacted and followed through with violent policies of repression against the 
radical Christian groups like the Anabaptists. However, those spaces and periods of time in 
which toleration became the order of the day showed a remarkable facility to impact the views of 
individual citizens and their everyday interaction. Mixed record or not, the Peace proved that 
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even during the polarized environment of Reformation era Europe, people of different faiths 
could create a single functional community together if given the chance. 
 What, then, do the examples of Augsburg, Cologne, and Nuremberg reveal about the 
nature of the Peace of Augsburg in the free imperial cities? Evidently, the treaty had many flaws, 
which a wide range of actors exploited as the atmosphere of the Holy Roman Empire as a whole 
became confessionalized, but this should not take away from the major strides the Peace made in 
first few decades after the Princes’ War, as it not only allowed confessions to live next to one 
another, but even created a space in which they could truly live together. Furthermore, the gains 
made by Article Twenty-Seven for religious diversity endured in Augsburg and a few of its 
fellows through the Thirty Years’ War and beyond. In the investigation of tolerance in the early 
modern period, therefore, the free imperial cities remain a case study with much information to 
offer about how individual communities have responded to the challenge of diversity in an era of 
divisiveness and mutual hostility. 
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